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Abstract
Due to the increasing number of civilians making use of airliners for business and travel
purposes, safe and reliable operation of commercial passenger airliners is essential. Air-
craft upsets are particular conditions that may result in fatal accidents. The accurate
identification of such upsets, however, can greatly reduce the risk of fatal accidents.
Conventional flight control systems for aircraft are designed to operate within a spec-
ified flight envelope, which is defined by an allowable range of air incidence angles (called
the angle of attack and side-slip angle), airspeeds, and angular rates over which the aero-
dynamic forces and moments behave linearly. The flight envelope is also defined by an
allowable range of aircraft attitudes (pitch angles and bank angles) and flight trajecto-
ries. When the aircraft exceeds its flight envelope, it enters the upset domain, where the
aircraft typically stalls and may enter an uncontrolled spin. A need therefore exists for a
system that can detect and recognise “out-of-envelope” conditions using on-board sensor
measurements.
Pilots are not always aware that the aircraft has entered the upset domain, especially
if visual cues are not available, and may respond with incorrect actions. It is however
possible for a pilot to recover from an upset event, but the knowledge of the specific upset
event is of utmost importance. A need therefore exists to advise the pilot of an occurring
upset so that the correct recovery actions can be taken.
This thesis presents the design and verification of an upset detection system for com-
mercial passenger airliners that detects and identifies flight upset conditions using clas-
sification techniques operating on sensor data from on-board anemometric and inertial
sensors. The study focused on three aerodynamic upsets, namely high angle of attack up-
set, underspeed upset and a novel predictive form of high angle of attack upset detection
named dynamic pitch upset.
The upset detection system used classification algorithms trained on labelled anemo-
metric and/or inertial sensor measurements. A wide variety of classifiers were investigated
in order to determine the feasibility of classification-based upset detection.
The three aerodynamic upset detection systems were evaluated across two cases,
namely those that utilised sensor data from both the anemometric and inertial sensors,
and those using data from only the inertial sensors. The high angle of attack upset detec-
tion system provided an accuracy of 98.8% for initial test case and an accuracy of 92.2%
for the latter. The underspeed upset detection system provided an accuracy of 99.3% for
the first case and 89.4% for the second case. The dynamic pitch upset detection system
provided an accuracy of 93.6% for the initial case and 91.4% for the latter.
The high classifier accuracies provided a suitable and reliable means for aircraft up-
set detection. These accuracies, along with the locations of the false alarms—the false
alarms occur near the upset boundary—enable the pilots to detect and recognise instances
pertaining to upset.
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Uittreksel
Die toenemende aantal individue wat gebruik maak van lugvaart noodsaak onbetwisbare
betroubaarheid van kommersie¨le-passasier-vliegtuie. Noodlottige vlug ongelukke mag die
gevolg van ’n buite vlugbestek toestand wees. Die akkurate identifisering van hierdie buite
vlugbestek toestande mag ’n noemenswaardige vermindering in noodlottige ongelukke
teweegbring.
Konvensionele vlug-beheerstelsels is ontwerp om binne ’n vasgestelde vlugbestek te
funksioneer. Hierdie vlugbestek word gedefinieer as die toelaatbare reeks lugvloei-invalshoeke,
lugspoed-intervalle en hoek-tempos waarin die ae¨rodinamiese-kragte en -momente lineeˆr
reageer. Die vlugbestek word ook deur die toelaatbare reeks vliegtuig-orie¨ntasies en vlug-
trajekte bepaal. Indien die vliegtuig die vlugbestek verlaat, betree dit ’n buite vlugbestek
toestand, waar die vliegtuig mag staak en onbeheerd-tol. ’n Stelsel wat buite vlugbestek
toestande kan identifiseer deur gebruik te maak van beskikbare sensore word dus genood-
saak.
Vliee¨niers mag soms nie bewus wees van ’n buite vlugbestek toestand nie, en mag
gevolglik met die verkeerde dade reageer. Dit is moontlik om vanuit ’n buite vlugbestek
toestand te herstel, maar die kennis van die spesifieke buite vlugbestek toestand is krities
in die´ verband. ’n Stelsel wat die vliee¨nier inlig van ’n buite vlugbestek toestand sodat
die nodige maatree¨ls gevolg kan word, is dus van uiterste belang.
Die ontwerp en verifikasie van ’n buite vlugbestek opsporingstelsel vir kommersie¨le
vliegtuie deur die klassifisering van beskikbare sensor metings, word in hierdie tesis aange-
bied. Drie verskillende buite vlugbestek toestande, naamlik hoe¨-aanvalshoek, laespoed en
dinamiese-hellingshoek was ondersoek.
Die klassifikasie-algoritmes wat ondersoek is, is afgerig op gemerkte anemometries- en
inersie¨le-sensor lesings. ’n Wye verskeidenheid van klassifikasie-algoritmes was ondersoek
om die vermoe¨ daarvan as buite vlugbestek opsporingstelsel te bepaal.
Twee gevalle per buite vlugbestek toestand was ondersoek, naamlik anemometries- en
inerisie¨le-sensore beskikbaar, en slegs inersie¨le-sensore beskikbaar. Die hoe¨-aanvalshoek-
opsporingstelsel het akkuraathede van 98.8% en 92.2% vir die twee gevalle onderskei-
delik behaal. Die laespoed-opsporingstelsel het akkuraathede 99.3% en 93.6% vir die
twee gevalle onderskeidelik behaal. Die dinamiese-hellingshoek-opsporingstelse het akku-
raathede van 93.6% en 91.4% vir die twee gevalle onderskeidelik behaal.
Die hoe¨ akkuraatheid van die stelsels het bygedra tot meer betroubare buite vlugbestek
opsporing. Hierdie akkuraathede, gepaard met die posisies van die vals-alarms, (vals-
alarms het plaasgevind naby die grens van buite vlugbestek), bemagtig vliee¨niers om
buite vlugbestek toestande beter te identifiseer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides and introduction and overview of the research performed in this
thesis. The background and motivation for research on flight upset detection is provided,
and the concept of flight upset is defined. This is followed by a literature survey of previous
research on upset detection for aircraft. The research goal is then stated and elaborated
into a list of project objectives. The high level project approach is then described and
the main contributions of the research are highlighted. The introduction concludes with
an outline of the thesis structure and a summary of the material that will be presented
in each chapter.
1.1 Background
Due to the increasing number of civilians making use of airliners for business and travel
purposes, safe and reliable operation of commercial passenger airliners is essential. Air-
craft upsets are particular conditions that may result in fatal accidents. The accurate
identification of such upsets, however, can potentially reduce the occurrence of fatal acci-
dents.
Conventional flight control systems for aircraft are designed to operate within a spec-
ified flight envelope, which is defined by an allowable range of air incidence angles (called
the angle of attack and side-slip angle), airspeeds, and angular rates over which the aero-
dynamic forces and moments behave linearly. The flight envelope is also defined by an
allowable range of aircraft attitudes (pitch angles and bank angles) and flight trajecto-
ries. When the aircraft exceeds its flight envelope, it enters the upset domain, where the
aircraft typically stalls and may enter an uncontrolled spin. Pilots are not always aware
that the aircraft has entered the upset domain, especially if visual cues are not available,
and may respond with incorrect actions. A need therefore exists for a system that can
detect and recognise “out-of-envelope” conditions using on-board sensor measurements,
and advise the pilot so that the correct recovery actions can be taken.
Typical aerodynamic upset warning systems use measurements of the airflow around
the aircraft captured by the anemometric sensors. Anemometric sensors measure the air-
flow around the aircraft airfoil, this is typically done with tubes that measure air-pressure.
These measurements include airspeed, angle of attack and side-slip measurements. Tra-
ditional warning systems apply thresholds on the anemometric measurements in order
to determine the upset. These thresholds may vary depending on a various input vari-
ables such as altitude, airspeed, etc. Traditional warning systems, however, are highly
dependent on the data from anemometric sensors. If these (anemometric) sensors fail,
1
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the warning system is rendered useless. A redundancy measure is therefore required to
enable reliable aerodynamic upset detection.
This project seeks to investigate and implement reliable aerodynamic upset detection
using the classification of sensor measurements from both the anemometric sensors and
the inertial sensors. Inertial sensors are sensors based on inertia, and are used to measure
linear accelerations and angular rates of an object. This thesis focused on three aerody-
namic upsets, namely high angle of attack upset, underspeed upset and a predictive form
of high angle of attack upset detection named dynamic pitch upset.
1.2 Definitions of Flight Upset
Defining flight upset is an important first step in developing an upset detection system.
The aforementioned definition will be used to establish the motivation and the primary
focus for this project. This section initially presents a brief study on the leading cause
of fatal large transport aircraft accidents; this serves as the motivation for the research
presented in this thesis. Thereafter, flight upsets are defined and discussed.
Aircraft loss-of-control (LOC) is currently the leading cause of fatal large transport
aircraft accidents[1]. Loss-of-control is defined as the inability of a pilot to control the
aircraft. An investigation to better understand LOC accidents was conducted by Will-
born and Foster[2]. Five two-dimensional parameter envelope spaces were defined that
contributed to the LOC accidents. These envelopes relate to the aircraft aerodynamics,
flight dynamics, structural integrity and flight control use. The five envelopes identified
are shown in Figure 1.1 and are listed below:
- Adverse Aerodynamic Envelope: angle of attack vs. side-slip angle
- Unusual Attitude Envelope: bank angle vs. pitch angle
- Structural Integrity Envelope: normal load factor vs. normalised airspeed
- Dynamic Pitch control Envelope: dynamic pitch attitude (θ + θ˙∆t) vs. % pitching
control command
- Dynamic Roll control Envelope: dynamic roll attitude (φ + φ˙∆t) vs. % lateral
control command
The adverse aerodynamic envelope defines the limits on the aircraft’s angle of attack
and side-slip angle. Exiting this envelope typically results in some form of aerodynamic
upset.
The unusual attitude envelope is defined by the limits on the bank angle and pitch
angle, these limits are based on the generally accepted industry definitions of “unusual
attitude”. Bank angles greater than ±45◦ and pitch angles higher than 25◦ nose up and
lower than 10◦ nose down, are considered to be unusual.
The structural integrity envelope is defined by the normal load factor and airspeed
limits on an aircraft. The normal load factor limits are prescribed by the Federal Aviation
Regulations, based on the structural design requirements of -1 to +2.5 g.
The dynamic pitch control envelope shows the pitch axis control authority (elevator)
versus the dynamic pitch attitude. The dynamic pitch attitude is a predicted pitch at-
titude, based on the current pitch attitude, and its expected change over one second.
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Figure 1.1: The five two-dimensional envelopes: (a)Adverse Aerodynamics Envelope,
(b)Unusual Attitude Envelope, (c)Structural Integrity Envelope, (d)Dynamic Pitch Con-
trol Envelope, (e)Dynamic Roll Control Envelope, adapted from Willborn and Foster[2].
This envelope indicates whether sufficient actuator authority is available to arrest a pitch
motion before the pitch attitude exceeds the unusual attitude envelope.
The dynamic roll control envelope shows the roll axis control authority (aileron) versus
the dynamic roll attitude. The dynamic roll attitude is a predicted roll attitude based on
the current roll attitude and its expected change over one second. This envelope indicates
whether sufficient actuator authority is available to arrest a rolling motion before the roll
attitude exceeds the unusual attitude envelope.
Belcastro and Foster continued on this research to identify the causal and contributing
factors to LOC accidents. The three main categories identified were adverse on-board
conditions, vehicle upsets and external hazards. Vehicle upset contributed to 77.8% of
LOC accidents in some way, with the majority of vehicle upsets being aerodynamic upsets
[3]. Aircraft upset is defined as the aircraft being outside its normal mode of operation
and aerodynamic upset is the aircraft’s inability to produce sufficient lift to support its
own weight.
Given the aforementioned definition of aerodynamic upset, we can conclude that there
is indeed a need for detection and recognition of aerodynamic upset conditions. Such a
system will enable the pilot to respond with the appropriate recovery actions.
1.3 Previous Research
The most rudimentary form of upset detection is identification of an aerodynamic upset
by a pilot. As an aircraft approaches an aerodynamic upset; the airflow across the up-
per cambered surface of the wing ceases to flow smoothly and becomes turbulent. The
turbulent air then flows across the horizontal stabiliser causing buffeting. This is called
pre-stall buffet, and pilots are trained to recognise this effect as a warning sign for an
impending upset.
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An aerodynamic upset detection/warning system is required on all large transport
aircraft, as per section 207 in part 25 of the FAA’s Federal Aviation Regulations(FAR)
[4]. An audible aerodynamic upset warning system is required in all commercial aircraft;
this device sounds an audible warning as a stall speed is approached. Angle of attack
sensor measurements are compared with predetermined critical angle of attack angles at
different configurations and flight points. A critical angle of attack is the angle of attack
where the lift produced by the air-foil reaches a maximum. A stick shaker is a device
designed to prevent aerodynamic upset [5]. The stick shaker is activated as the aircraft
approaches the critical angle of attack. A stick shaker is a mechanical device that shakes
the control column to warn the pilots of an imminent aerodynamic upset.
A form of predictive angle of attack upset detection was proposed by Heinsohn and
Neary. The system predicts high angle of attack upset by determining the time rate of
change of aircraft’s angle of attack. This time rate of change is added to the current angle
of attack and compared with a reference level [6].
The majority of the existing research in this research field has been done on Upset
Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) by the International Committee for Aviation
Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). Research done by Advani and Field contained
improvements to flight simulators, including an improvement of the surprise factor during
an upset [7]. Improvements on the accuracy of the simulation’s mathematical model to
improve the realism of upsets, and the improvement on motion cueing were the main
focus of the research. A combination of an improved flight simulator and an update of
the stall training curriculum was proposed to better equip pilots in the event of an upset
occurring.
The Simulation of Upset Recovery in Aviation (SUPRA) project, which ties in with the
UPRT project, focussed on the improvement of flight simulators used in pilot training [8].
The project included an extended aerodynamic model, capturing the key aerodynamics
during and beyond stall for large transport aircraft. New motion cueing solutions for
hexapod and centrifuge-based simulation platforms were developed.
The sensors on aircraft have different failure rates due to the functioning of the different
sensors. Anemometric sensors have a higher failure rate than inertial sensors [9]. Making
use of the more reliable inertial data to estimate anemometric data will add a form of
redundancy to an aerodynamic upset detection system, and consequently improve the
overall reliability of the system. Estimating anemometric data from the inertial sensors is
a popular field of research. The main motivation for the research is to reduce the weight
and cost of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [10]. These estimates of the anemometric
data can be used as “virtual sensors” in combination with conventional aerodynamic
upset warning systems [11]. The accuracy and precision of the estimate will have an
impact on the performance of the warning system. Special consideration should be given
to the computational complexity of the estimator, since the estimation algorithm will be
executed on the aircraft’s flight computer and the flight computer has limited processing
power and memory capacity.
The estimation of anemometric sensor data can be split into two main categories.
In the fist category, the total body accelerations and the angular rates of the aircraft,
along with an aerodynamic model of the aircraft, are used to estimate the anemometric
states of the aircraft. Knowing all the forces, moments and the aerodynamic model of the
aircraft enables the estimation of anemometric states [12]. In the second category, the
anemometric data is calculated from estimates of the ground speed vector and the wind
vector.
Oosterom and Babusˇka proposed a virtual angle of attack sensor in small commercial
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aircraft, using the combination of a Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy model and a neural network
model [11]. The fuzzy model uses Mach number, dynamic pressure, bank angle, position
of the centre of gravity along the X-axis and the aircraft’s weight to estimate the trim angle
of attack. The neural network is used to estimate the part of the angle of attack signal that
can not be modelled by the fuzzy model, which accounts for the high frequency transient
angle of attack components. The neural network takes pitch angle, normal acceleration,
pitch rate and bank angle as inputs. The proposed system had a root-mean-square error
(RMSE) of 0.1125◦ on the angle of attack estimation. It was, however, not tested for
angle of attack angles in the upset domain, where a degradation of accuracy is expected,
as the aircraft model is more non-linear at high angle of attack angles. No information
regarding the computational complexity was given.
Morelli proposed the real time estimation of aerodynamic parameters without anemo-
metric sensor measurements [12]. The time rate of change of the aircraft velocity vector
was determined from the aircraft’s current velocity, angular rates, attitude, the total body
accelerations, the thrust applied and the aircraft’s aerodynamic coefficients [13]. This time
rate of change was used to propagate the aircraft velocity that was used to calculate the
anemometric data. The system was tested on simulated F16 fighter jet data and on flight
data from a sub-scale jet transport aircraft. The system showed promising results, but
quantitative estimation error results were not given in the paper.
Ramprasadh and Arya considered the estimation of aerodynamic angles of a mini aerial
vehicle in turbulent atmosphere [14]. Their estimation algorithm involved two Extended
Kalman filters in a cascade configuration. The first one was used to estimate the aircraft’s
attitude and the second was used to estimate the angle of attack and the side-slip angle.
The angle of attack and side-slip angle were propagated using the total body accelerations,
angular rates, mass and an initial angle of attack and side-slip angle. This system had
mean errors of on the estimates of the angle of attack and side-slip angle of 1.5◦ and 0.03◦
respectively.
Perry et al. used the ground speed vector and an estimate of the wind vector to
estimate the anemometric data [10]. The ground speed is measured using the inertial
navigation system. The wind vector was estimated from the ground speed vector, aircraft
heading and a pitot tube measurement. The difference of the measured ground speed
vector and the estimate of the wind vector is used to calculate the angle of attack and
side-slip angle. This method assumes horizontal flight; as a result, the performance of the
proposed system therefore degraded drastically with highly dynamic flight.
The accuracy of the estimated anemometric data may vary considerably with the
quality of the inertial sensors and the accuracy of the aerodynamic model. The dynamics
of the manoeuvres performed by the aircraft and the intensity of the wind disturbances
have a great influence on the performance of the estimators. Multiple anemometric data
estimators exist in the literature, but a quantitative comparison is not possible due to the
difference in aircraft, inertial sensors and the dynamics of the manoeuvres performed.
1.4 Research Goal
The research goal was the design and verification of an upset detection system for com-
mercial passenger airliners that detects and identifies flight upset conditions using classi-
fication techniques operating on dissimilar sensor data from on-board anemometric and
inertial sensors.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.5 Project Objectives
The research objectives for this project are listed below:
- Detect and recognise aerodynamic upset conditions in commercial passenger aircraft.
- Use inertial sensor data to add redundancy to the upset detection system in case
anemometric sensors are not available.
- Investigate the use of classification-based techniques (supervised machine learning)
for upset detection.
- Compare the performance of the classification-based approach to upset detection
against the more established estimator-based approaches to upset detection found
in literature.
- Detect high angle of attack upset conditions, underspeed upsets and dynamic pitch
upsets.
- Evaluate the performance of the upset detection system with a statistical analysis
of the correct detections, missed detections and false alarms.
- The upset detection function must not provide false alarms in the normal flight
domain of the aircraft. A false alarm could cause the pilot to take an inappropriate
action, which could lead to an upset.
- Validate and verify the upset detection system with data generated using a repre-
sentative simulation model of an Airbus A330 with representative sensor noise and
environmental disturbances.
1.6 Project Approach
A classification based upset detection system that can detect multiple aerodynamic upsets
and operate without anemometric sensors could not be found in the literature. All the
current warning systems installed in aircraft have a strong dependence on the anemometric
sensors.
An upset detection system detecting and identifying high angle of attack, underspeed
and dynamic pitch upsets using classification techniques was developed in this project.
Definitions of the upset classes were formulated to ensure the correct labelling of the train-
ing and testing data for the classifiers. These definitions formed the core of the system; it
was therefore of utmost importance that the definitions be representative of the upsets.
Given that flight dynamics knowledge is necessary to fully understand the dynamics of an
aircraft entering a stall, a background study of flight dynamics was conducted and used
to specify upset definitions, to generate training and test data sets, and to evaluate the
classifier results.
Different classification algorithms were investigated to determine the most suitable
classifier for each of the individual upset classes. Suitable classification algorithms are
presented and discussed to provide some background information on the principles of
operation, training, and implementation of the different classifiers.
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Data generation for the training and testing of the classifiers was the next focus of the
project. The classifiers need to be trained on equal numbers of upset samples and non-
upset samples to ensure an unbiased classifier. Two sensor scenarios were considered, one
where both anemometric sensors and inertial sensors were available, and one where only
inertial sensors were available. The classifier performance was then evaluated in terms of
their accuracy (percentages of correct detections, missed detections and false alarms) as
well as in terms of the locations of the misidentified samples relative to the normal flight
domain and the upset domain. False alarms in the normal flight domain were deemed
unacceptable, since they could cause the pilot to take an inappropriate action, which
could lead to an upset.
The classifier accuracies at different anemometric sensor noise levels were compared
to the accuracy of a conventional upset warning system that simply thresholds the noisy
sensor measurements or noisy estimates of the anemometric states. This provides a rough
comparison between upset detection using a classification-based approach and upset de-
tection using an estimation-based approach.
The upset detection system was validated by performing simulated upset manoeuvres
with the Airbus A330 simulation model that cause the aircraft to enter and then recover
from the different types of upset conditions.
1.7 Contributions
The contributions made by this research are listed below:
- A classification based approach to aircraft upset detection was developed. Previous
research on upset detection predominately used an estimator based approach.
- An assortment of classification algorithms were considered for the application of
upset detection, and their respective performances were evaluated and compared.
- A novel sampling strategy was proposed to generate the training and testing data
sets for the classifiers. The random samples are generated to be a union of a wide
uniform sample distribution over the entire aircraft state space, and a tight normal
distribution about the critical angle of attack surface. The wide uniform sample
distribution enables the classifier to correctly distinguish between non-upset and
upset conditions that are far away from the critical angle of attack surface, while
the normal distribution enables the classifier to accurately discriminate between non-
upset and upset conditions for samples that “tightly” surround the critical angle of
attack surface.
- A novel form of predictive high angle of attack upset detection was defined and
developed.
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1.8 Thesis Overview
The overview of the thesis are listed below:
- Chapter 1 gives a detailed description of the problem addressed by this study.
- Chapter 2 presents the necessary background information on flight mechanics and
the implementation thereof in a non-linear simulation model.
- Chapter 3 introduces the reader to binary classification and the classification algo-
rithms investigated for upset detection.
- Chapter 4 provides the design and validation of an upset detection system for com-
mercial passenger airliners.
- Chapters 5 to 7 present the design and verification of upset detection functions
for high angle of attack upset detection, underspeed detection, and dynamic pitch
detection respectively.
- Chapter 8 provides a summary of the research performed and the conclusions
reached, and gives recommendations for future research.
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Introduction to Flight Dynamics
The mathematical model and its corresponding simulation model for the A330 aircraft are
presented and discussed in this chapter. This project made use of an A330-300 aircraft
simulation model received from Airbus. The data generated for classifier training and test-
ing were generated with this model. The labelling models for the three upset classes were
also determined form this model. It is therefore important to have a good understanding
of flight dynamics and the mathematical model used to simulate the aircraft.
The chapter starts with an introduction to the conventions and notations used in this
the simulation model. The six-degree-of-freedom equations of motion with the forces and
moments acting on an aircraft are presented to the reader. The Simulink simulation model
received from Airbus is lastly discussed.
2.1 Conventions and Notation
Background information such as axis conventions, notations and assumptions are dis-
cussed in order to make sense of the aircraft’s mathematical model. Figure 2.1 shows
the aircraft body axis system, the standard notation and the aerodynamic control surface
with the positive deflection angles[13].
2.1.1 Axis Systems
Three axes systems are commonly used when modelling the flight mechanics of aircraft,
namely inertial axes, body axes, and wind axes.
2.1.1.1 Inertial Axes
The standard North East Down (NED) axis system (XE, YE, ZE) is used as the inertial
axis system. An inertial reference frame is required to apply Newton’s laws of motion
which govern the flight mechanics of the aircraft. The NED axes system assumes a flat,
non-rotating earth and adequately approximates an inertial reference frame over the short
flight distances considered in this project. The origin of the axis is chosen to match a
convenient reference point on the earth’s surface. The XE-axis points north, the YE-axis
is in the east direction and the ZE-axis points downwards towards the centre of the earth.
Gravity is assumed to be in the ZE direction.
9
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2.1.1.2 Body Axes
The body axis system is fixed to the aircraft body. Figure 2.1 shows the body axis system
(XB, YB, ZB) with its origin chosen to coincide with the aircraft’s centre of mass. The
body axis system moves and rotates with the aircraft body. The XB-axis is oriented along
the plane of symmetry of the aircraft and is directed towards the front (cockpit) of the
aircraft. The YB-axis is perpendicular to the plane of symmetry and is directed towards
the right-hand wing of the aircraft. The ZB-axis lies within the plane of symmetry and
points downwards relative to the cockpit. Most of the onboard sensor measurements, such
as the three-axis gyroscope and accelerometer measurements, are coordinated in the body
axis system.
2.1.1.3 Wind Axes
Wind axes are similar to the body axes in that their origin coincides with the centre of
mass and therefore move with the aircraft. The orientation of the wind axes differs from
the body axes in that the x-axis points in the direction of the velocity vector. The z-axis
lies in the aircraft’s plane of symmetry and the y-axis is perpendicular to the plane of
symmetry and is directed towards the right-hand wing of the aircraft.
2.1.2 Standard Notation
The standard aircraft notation used in this project is shown in Figure 2.1. The forces and
translational velocities are shown in red and the moments and angular rates are shown in
blue. The notations are as follows,
FX , FY , FZ : The coordinates of the force vector in the body axes
(longitudinal, lateral and normal force).
L,M,N: The coordinates of the moment vector in the body axes
(rolling, pitching and yawing moment).
U,V,W: The coordinates of the velocity vector in the body axes
(longitudinal, lateral and normal velocity).
P,Q,R: The coordinates of the angular velocity vector in the
body axes (roll, pitch and yaw rate).
δailInt , δailExt , δelv, δTHP , δrud: Inner and outer ailerons, elevator, horizontal stabiliser
and rudder control surface deflections respectively. A
positive deflection produces a negative moment.
The velocity vector (V¯) of the aircraft may be expressed in spherical coordinates using
a velocity magnitude (V¯ ), angle of attack (α) and side-slip angle (β). The relationship
between the Cartesian coordinates U, V and W, and the spherical coordinates V¯ , α and
β, of the aircraft velocity vector is given by Equation 2.1.1,

U
V
W

 =


V¯ cosα cos β
V¯ sin β
V¯ sinα cos β

 . (2.1.1)
As the speed of the aircraft approaches the speed of sound, the Mach number starts
playing an important role in the aerodynamic model. The Mach number is the ratio of
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the speed of the aircraft relative to the speed of sound in the surrounding air, expressed
mathematically ,
M =
V¯
c(alt)
, (2.1.2)
where M is the Mach number, V¯ is the speed of the aircraft, and c(alt) is the speed of
sound at the given altitude.
2.2 Six Degree of Freedom Equations of Motion
A six-degree-of-freedom rigid body model is used to effectively model the motion of an
aircraft. The six-degrees-of-freedom equations of motion describe the three-dimensional
translation and three-dimensional rotation motion of the body axis system relative to the
inertial axis system. A rigid body implies that the position of each mass element on the
aircraft remains fixed relative to the body axis system at all times.
The equations of motion can be arranged into two categories, namely kinetics and
kinematics. These two categories are discussed in separate sections to provide the reader
with necessary information regarding the six-degree-of-freedom model.
2.2.1 Kinetics
Kinetics is the branch of mechanics that relates the forces and moments acting on an
object to the kinematic state of the object, with the kinematic states being the position,
velocity and acceleration of the aircraft. These relations between forces and moments
and the kinematic states are derived from Newton’s second law of motion[13]. There are
a number of different forms of the kinetic equations of motion depending on which axis
systems are used during the coordination of the vectors involved. The equations of motion
are presented for the vectors coordinated in the body axes. As the body axis system may
rotate with an angular velocity of ωB with respect to the inertial space; the Coriolis
equation is used to coordinate the inertial rates of change to the body time derivative, as
shown in Equation 2.2.1.
d
dt
(R)]Inertial =
d
dt
(R)]Body + ωB ×R (2.2.1)
where R is an arbitrary vector.
The kinetic equations were separated into two categories, translational movement and
rotational movement, as shown in the remainder of this section.
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Translational Motion
Newton’s second law of motion states that all the external forces acting on the body must
be equal to the rate of change of its momentum as,
FB = maB]Inertial, (2.2.2)
where FB is the force vector, m is the mass and aB is the acceleration vector.
The Coriolis equation shown in Equation 2.2.1 is used to coordinate Equation 2.2.2 to
the body axis, as shown in Equation 2.2.3,
FB = maB]Body + ωB × (mVB), (2.2.3)
where VB and ωB are the velocity and angular rate vectors of the aircraft.
Expanding Equation 2.2.3 and grouping the forces per axis result in Equation 2.2.4,

Fx
Fy
Fz

 = m


U˙ +WQ− V R
V˙ + UR−WP
W˙ + V P − UQ

 . (2.2.4)
This shows the relation between the forces that act on an aircraft and the time rate of
change of its linear velocity. The various cross terms containing angular rates arise from
the coordination of the forces and velocity to the body axes, and not the inertial axis
system.
Rewriting Equation 2.2.4 with the rate of change of the velocities, (total body accel-
erations), as the subject of the equation becomes Equation 2.2.5,

U˙
V˙
W˙

 =


V R−WQ
WP − UR
UQ− V P

+ 1m


Fx
Fy
Fz

 . (2.2.5)
This is typically used to propagate the velocities of the aircraft over time.
Rotational Motion
Newton’s second law for rotational motion states that all the external moments acting on
the body must be equal to the rate of change of its angular momentum,
MB = IBω˙B]Inertial, (2.2.6)
with,
IB =


Ixx 0 Ixz
0 Iyy 0
Ixz 0 Izz

 , (2.2.7)
where IB is the moment of inertia matrix.
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A symmetrical aircraft in the XZ-plane this implies that Iyz and Ixy are therefore ex-
actly zero, which is an accurate assumption for all conventional aircraft. Applying Equa-
tion 2.2.1 to Equation 2.2.6 results in,
MB = IBω˙B]Body + ωB × (IBωB), (2.2.8)
and, expanding Equation 2.2.8, the three rotational components of the equations of motion
are shown in Equation 2.2.9,

L
M
N

 =


P˙ Ixx − R˙Ixz +QR(Izz − Iyy)− PQIxz
Q˙Iyy + PR(Ixx − Izz) + (P
2 −R2)Ixz
R˙Izz − P˙ Ixz + PQ(Iyy − Ixx) +QRIxz

 . (2.2.9)
Equation 2.2.10 shows the rate of change of the angular rates. This is used to propagate
the angular rates over time,

P˙
Q˙
R˙

 =


Ixz(Ixx−Iyy+Izz)PQ+(IzzIyy−I2zz+I
2
xz)QR
I2xz−IxxIzz
(Izz−Ixx)PR−(P 2−R2)Ixz
Iyy
Ixz(Iyy−Ixx+Izz)QR+(I2zz−IxxIyy+I
2
xz)PQ
I2xz−IxxIzz

+


IxzN−IzzL
I2xz−IxxIzz
M
Iyy
IxzL−IxxN
I2xz−IxxIzz

 . (2.2.10)
2.2.2 Kinematics
Kinematic equations show the relation among various motion variables, such as linear
velocity, angular velocity, attitude and position, to each other over time. An aircraft
attitude parametrisation is necessary to represent the body axes with respect to the
inertial axis system. The attitude representation is addressed in the following subsection.
Euler 3-2-1 Attitude Representation
A simple and intuitive parametrisation for aircraft attitude is Euler angles. The Euler
angle representation is used to describe the attitude of the body axes with respect to
the inertial axes, as shown in Figure 2.2. A roll angle (φ), is a rotation about the XB
axes, a pitch angle (θ), is a rotation about the YB axes and a yaw angle (ψ) is a rotation
around the ZB axes. The Euler 3-2-1 sequence is most commonly used to describe aircraft
attitude. This sequence starts with the inertial and body axis aligned and then moves
the body axis system though the following set of ordered rotations,
- Yaw the body axis positively through the yaw angle ψ.
- Pitch the body axis positively through the pitch angle θ
- Roll the body axis positively through the roll angle φ
The rotations made to represent the body axis system relative to the inertial axis
system are shown in Figure 2.3. A transformation matrix using Euler angles may be
used to transform the coordinates of a vector in the inertial axis system to the body axis
system. This transformation matrix is referred to as the Direction Cosine Matrix (DCM),

XB
YB
ZB

 = [DCM ]


XI
YI
ZI

 ,
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ψ
North
East
θ
Horizonφ
Horizon
Roll Angle
Pitch Angle
Yaw Angle
Figure 2.2: Representation of the three Euler angles used to describe the aircraft’s
attitude
ψ
XI
X1
YI
Y1
ZI,1
XI
X2
YI
Y2
ZI
θ
XI
XB
YI
YB
ZI
ZB
Z2
φ
Yaw with angle ψ Pitch with angle θ Roll with angle φ
ψ
θ
φ
Figure 2.3: Euler 3-2-1 transformation from the inertial axes to the body axes.
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with,
[DCM ] =


CψCθ SψCθ −Sθ
CψSθCφ − SψCφ SψSθSφ + CψCφ CθSφ
CψSθCφ + SψSφ SψSθCφ − CψSφ CθCφ

 (2.2.11)
where C() = cos(), S() = sin().
The inverse of the DCM is required in order to transform coordinates from the body
axis system to the inertial axis system. Since the DCM is an orthogonal matrix, its matrix
inverse is simply its transpose.
Attitude Dynamics
Given this Euler 3-2-1 attitude formulation, it is possible to relate the time rate of change
of the aircraft attitude to the body angular rates (PQR) through the following equation,

φ˙
θ˙
ψ˙

 =


1 sinφ tan θ cosφ tan θ
0 cosφ − sinφ
0 sinφ sec θ cosφ sec θ




P
Q
R

 , |θ| 6= 90◦. (2.2.12)
It is clear to see from Equation 2.2.12 that for θ = 90◦ the tan θ and sec θ terms become
infinite, this is referred to as gimbal lock. Aircraft in upset conditions might experience
high roll, pitch and yaw angles and a fully manoeuvrable system is therefore required
where there are no restrictions of the pitch angles.
Quaternion Attitude Parametrisation
An alternate method to express an object’s orientation is quaternions. Quaternions were
first formulated in 1843 by Sir William R. Hamilton and provide an efficient means for
updating orientations and more importantly, quaternions do not suffer from a singularity
at any attitude. The main disadvantage of quaternions is that they are not as easy and
intuitive to understand as the Euler attitude representation. Quaternions can be written
as a four-dimensional vector[15],
q = [e0, e1, e2, e3], (2.2.13)
these quaternion parameters are not independent, but are constrained by,
e20 + e
2
1 + e
2
2 + e
2
3 = 1. (2.2.14)
It can be shown that the DCM shown is Equation 2.2.11, can be written as the
following combination of quaternion parameters,
[DCM ] =


e20 + e
2
1 − e
2
2 − e
2
3 2(e0e3 + e1e2) 2(e1e3 − e0e2)
2(e1e2 − e0e3) e
2
0 − e
2
1 + e
2
2 − e
2
3 2(e0e1 + e2e3)
2(e0e2 + e1e3) 2(e2e3 − e0e1) e
2
0 − e
2
1 − e
2
2 + e
2
3

 (2.2.15)
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The transformation from Euler angles to quaternion parameters is as follows,

e0
e1
e2
e3

 =


cos ψ
2
cos θ
2
cos φ
2
+ sin ψ
2
sin θ
2
sin φ
2
cos ψ
2
cos θ
2
sin φ
2
− sin ψ
2
sin θ
2
cos φ
2
cos ψ
2
sin θ
2
cos φ
2
+ sin ψ
2
cos θ
2
sin φ
2
sin ψ
2
cos θ
2
cos φ
2
− cos ψ
2
sin θ
2
sin φ
2

 (2.2.16)
The time rate of change of the quaternions as a function of the aircraft’s angular rates
(P,Q,R) are as follows, 

e˙0
e˙1
e˙2
e˙3

 =
1
2


0 −P −Q −R
P 0 R −Q
Q −R 0 P
R Q −P 0




e0
e1
e2
e3

 . (2.2.17)
This allows aircraft attitude propagation over time without any restrictions on the
attitude of the aircraft. Equations 2.2.15 and 2.2.16 allow conversions between the Euler
attitude representation and the quaternion attitude representation.
2.3 Forces and Moments Model
The forces and moments acting on the aircraft must be modelled so that they can serve
as inputs to the six-degrees-of-freedom equations of motion discussed in section 2.2. The
forces and moments acting on an aircraft can typically be grouped into three categories,
namely aerodynamic, propulsion and gravitational. The total resultant force and moment
acting on the aircraft is the sum of the forces and moments from each of the three
categories. Since the gravitational force acts through the centre of mass of the aircraft,
and since the gravity field is assumed to be uniform, the gravitational moment acting on
the aircraft is assumed to be zero.
FB =


Fx
Fy
Fz

 =


FAx
FAy
FAz

+


F Tx
F Ty
F Tz

+


FGx
FGy
FGz

 , (2.3.1)
MB =


L
M
N

 =


LA
MA
NA

+


LT
MT
NT

 , (2.3.2)
where the superscripts A, T and G denote aerodynamic, propulsion and gravitational
components respectively. The following subsections will address each of these categories
in more detail.
Aerodynamic Forces and Moments
The aerodynamic forces and moments are produced by the relative motion of the air
and the aircraft; they are by far the most complex to model and introduce the most
uncertainty into the aircraft model. These forces and moments are functions of air-density
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(ρ), airspeed (V¯ ), size and geometry of the aircraft, angle of attack (α) and the Mach
number (M) at high speeds. The aerodynamic forces and moments are proportional to
the dynamic pressure (q¯) experienced by the aircraft, as defined below,
q¯ =
1
2
ρV¯ 2. (2.3.3)
where the air-density, ρ, is dependent on the air-temperature and air-pressure, which are
functions of the altitude of the aircraft.
The aerodynamic force and moments are defined below,

FAx
FAy
FAz

 =


q¯SCX
q¯SCY
q¯SCZ

 , (2.3.4)


LA
MA
NA

 =


q¯SbCl
q¯Sc¯Cm
q¯SbCn

 , (2.3.5)
where S is the wing reference area, b is the wing span, c¯ is the mean aerodynamic chord
of the wing and CX , CY , CZ , Cl, Cm, Cn are non-dimensional aerodynamic force and
moment coefficients. The aircraft size parameters are shown in Figure 2.4.
Wingspan, b
Wing reference area, S
Cho
rd,
c¯
Figure 2.4: The definition of wing reference area S, mean aerodynamic chord c¯ and
wing span b
The aerodynamic forces and moments are manipulated to control the aircraft. This is
done by changing the aerodynamics of the aircraft with actuator deflections (δail, δelv, δrud).
The aerodynamics of an aircraft can be modelled as a non-linear function dependent on
multiple flight parameters. The components of the aerodynamic forces and moments can
be expressed in terms of non-dimensional coefficients, as shown in Equations 2.3.6 and
2.3.7,


CX
CY
CZ

 =


CX(α, β,M,Q,Alt, δTHP , xCG, δelv, δspoiler)
CY (α, β,M, P,R,Alt, xCG, δailInt , δailExt , δrud, δspoiler)
CZ(α, β,M,Q,Alt, δTHP , xCG, δelv, δspoiler)

 , (2.3.6)
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

Cl
Cm
Cn

 =


Cl(α, β,M, P,R,Alt, xCG, δailInt , δailExt , δrud, δspoiler)
Cm(α, β,M,Q,Alt, δTHP , xCG, δelv, δspoiler)
Cn(α, β,M, P,R,Alt, xCG, δailInt , δailExt , δrud, δspoiler)

 , (2.3.7)
The aerodynamic coefficients used to model the aerodynamics of an Airbus A330
aircraft, are non-linear functions dependent on the following variables,
Linear velocity:
α - Angle of attack (deg),
β - Side-slip angle (deg),
M - Mach number (),
Angular velocity:
P - Roll rate (deg/s),
Q - Pitch rate (deg/s),
R - Yaw rate (deg/s),
Aircraft configuration and altitude:
xCG - Position of the centre of gravity in the XB axis as a per-
centage of c¯, measured from a reference point (specified
by manufacturer)
(%),
Alt - Altitude (ft),
Control surface deflections:
δailInt - Interior aileron deflection (deg),
δailExt - Exterior aileron deflection (deg),
δTHP - Horizontal stabiliser deflection (deg),
δelv - Elevator deflection (deg),
δrud - Rudder deflection (deg),
δspoiler - Spoiler deflection (deg).
The aerodynamic coefficient functions are implemented as a neural networks that take
the above mentioned variables as inputs. These neural networks were trained to fit the
aerodynamic model of the A330 based on data generated by simulation, wind-tunnel tests
and practical flight tests.
Gravitational Forces and Moments
The gravitational forces and moments acting on the aircraft are modelled using a simple
gravitational model that assumes a constant gravitational acceleration that does not vary
with latitude or altitude. The standard value for gravitational acceleration is used, and it
is assumed to point downwards in the inertial axis system. The gravitational acceleration
vector is aligned with the ZE axis with the origin at the aircraft’s centre of gravity, as
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shown by Equation 2.3.8,
FE
G =


0
0
mg

 . (2.3.8)
Transforming the gravitational force to the body axis system using the DCM in Equa-
tion 2.2.11 yields an expression for the gravitational force in body axes shown in Equa-
tion 2.3.9. The transformed gravitational force is shown in Figure 2.5.


FGx
FGy
FGz

 =


CψCθ SψCθ −Sθ
CψSθCφ − SψCφ SψSθSφ + CψCφ CθSφ
CψSθCφ + SψSφ SψSθCφ − CψSφ CθCφ




0
0
mg

 = mg


− sin θ
cos θ sinφ
cos θ cosφ

 .
(2.3.9)
Figure 2.5 shows the decomposition for the forces described in Equation 2.3.9,
XB
ZB
YB
mg
FGx
FGy
FGz
Figure 2.5: The forces in the body axis due to the weight of the aircraft
Since the gravitational force acts through the centre of mass of the aircraft, and since
the gravity field is assumed to be uniform, the gravitational moment acting on the aircraft
is assumed to be zero, 

LG
MG
NG

 =


0
0
0

 . (2.3.10)
Propulsion Forces and Moments
The propulsion of the aircraft is primarily used to gain sufficient airspeed over the aerofoil
to produce the lift necessary to overcome gravity. The thrust force produced by the
aircraft’s engines are aligned with the XB axis and is displaced with δ
T
Y in the y-direction
and δTZ in the z-direction from its centre of gravity. Figure 2.6 shows the thrust force
produced and the moments induced due to the engine offsets from the centre of gravity.
Equations 2.3.11 and 2.3.12 show the forces and moments generated by the propulsion.
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The rolling LT and yawing moment NT produced by the engines are zero, due to the
symmetrical thrust assumed in this project.

F Tx
F Ty
F Tz

 =


Tleft + Tright
0
0

 , (2.3.11)


LT
MT
NT

 =


0
(Tleft + Tright) · δ
T
Z
0

 , (2.3.12)
where Tleft and Tright are the thrust produced by the left and right engines respectively.
A pitching moment is present due to the engine offset in the z-direction.
Tleft + Tright
δTZ
MT = (Tleft + Tright) · δ
T
Z
Tleft
Tright
δTY
δTY
NT = (Tleft − Tright) · δTY
Top
Side
Figure 2.6: The forces and moments produced by the thrust of the aircraft
Mathematical Model Overview
An implementation of the six-degree-of-freedom model for a rigid body with the non-linear
forces and moments acting on it, was used in this project. The mathematical model used
in this project is shown in Figure 2.7
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Figure 2.8: Simulink model of an Airbus A330 (top level)
2.4 A330 Simulation Model for Matlab Simulink
Airbus provided a Simulink simulation model that is representative of an Airbus A330
aircraft to the electronic systems laboratory (ESL) for research use. The top level repre-
sentation of the simulation model consists of seven components, as shown in Figure 2.8.
These include pilot inputs, flight control laws, actuator modelling, a non-linear aircraft
model, wind disturbances, sensor modelling and lastly the sensor outputs. A brief de-
scription of each component block is given to the reader in the following subsections.
Pilot Inputs
The pilot input block consists of two subsections, namely actuator commands and hold
modes. A user has the option to give direct actuator deflection reference commands,
this simulates the commands received from the control column, pedals and throttle. The
actuator inputs to the simulation model are,
δail - Aileron deflections,
δelv - Elevator deflection,
δrud - Rudder deflection,
Thrust - Thrust supplied by the propulsion system of the air-
craft,
Air brakes - Air brake configuration.
The second input option supplied by the simulation model is hold modes. The hold
modes are auto-pilot functions that keep the aircraft at specified flight variable values. It
calculates the required actuator defection reference to achieve this. The three hold modes
supplied are a yaw angle hold mode, flight path angle hold mode and side-slip angle hold
mode.
Control Laws
The control laws take the commanded pilot/hold mode references and the aircraft sensor
measurements to determined the desired control deflections to achieve these references.
The control laws consist of longitudinal and lateral estimators and controllers in order to
control the aircraft. These controllers are implemented as S-functions, the inner functions
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are therefore concealed to the user. The control law block includes an auto-thrust S-
function that is used to generate propulsion commands given a desired airspeed.
Actuators
The actuator dynamics are modelled using a first order low-pass filter, saturation and
rate limiting blocks. The low-pass filter is used to introduce the low frequency dynamics
introduced by the physical actuators. A saturation block is added to simulate the mini-
mum and maximum actuator deflections. The rate limiter is introduced after the low-pass
filter to constrain the rate at which an actuator is allowed to be deflected.
Wind Model
The original simulation model received, allowed the user to specify only a constant wind
disturbances. This was found to be inadequate for the purpose of this project. A realistic
wind model was therefore implemented. This wind model consisted of three components,
the constant wind model, turbulence and wind shear.
The physical science division of the Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL), which
forms part of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), makes available global wind data in the NED axes at different
flight levels. Global wind data sets are updated every six hours, at 17 different pres-
sure levels (1000, 925, 850, 700, 600, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 70, 50, 30, 20, 10mb) in
a 2.5◦×2.5◦ spatial grid (0◦E to 357.5◦E, −90◦N to 90◦N)[16]. The constant wind inputs
(Uwind, Vwind,Wwind) for the simulation model were based on the global wind figures for
2015. The wind disturbance samples were calculated as uniformly distributed between
the 10th and 90th percentile of the wind in each axis. Removing the bottom and top
10th percentiles removes the extreme wind velocities, resulting in a model representative
of the typical wind encountered by and passenger airliner. The generated constant wind
was orientated in the inertial space was therefore rotated to the body axes.
A von-Ka´rma´n turbulence model[17] was implemented to calculate the turbulence as-
sociated with the constant wind, velocity vector and altitude. This calculated turbulence
was added to the constant wind in order to obtain an accurate representation of the wind
disturbance. The wind shear associated with the given wind disturbances were added as
disturbances to the angular rates.
Non-linear Aircraft Model
The non-linear aircraft model consisted of the six-degree-of-freedom equations with the
aerodynamic, propulsion and gravitational forces and moments, as discussed previously
in this chapter. The inputs to the aircraft model are, actuator deflections as output by
the control laws, wind disturbances and the aircraft’s altitude. The inputs and initial
aircraft states (attitude, velocity and angular rates) were used to propagate the aircraft
states and to calculate a large variety aircraft sensor measurements as discussed later in
this chapter.
Sensor Outputs
The simulation model offers a wide variety of simulation outputs. It was decided to
capture the sensor outputs typically available on a large transport aircraft. These outputs
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Table 2.2: The sensor measurements captured to be used for upset detection.
Inertial Navigation System
Altitude The altitude of the aircraft
φ, θ, ψ The attitude of the aircraft expressed in Euler angles
γ The aircraft’s flight path angle
P,Q,R The angular rates of the aircraft
ax, ay, az The total body acceleration of the aircraft
Anemometric Sensors
Vcas, α, β The aircraft’s relative airspeed vector expressed in po-
lar form, as calibrated airspeed, angle of attack and
side-slip angle.
consisted in sensor measurements made available by the inertial navigation system (INS)
and the anemometric sensors, as shown in Table 2.2. These sensor measurements were
used as the inputs to the upset detection system developed.
Sensor Modelling
The default simulation model received from Airbus did not include any sensor noise, but
only modelled the sensor’s bandwidth by adding a low-pass filter to the calculated sensor
measurement. Adding representative sensor noise to the calculated sensor measurements
is an important aspect in ensuring a representative simulation model. Classifier accuracy
in the presence of sensor noise is an important performance metric, hence the need for
a noise model. It was therefore decided to add noise to the sensor simulated sensor
measurements.
Little information was available on the actual noise present on the different aircraft
sensor measurements and thus the available sensor information was used to postulate the
sensor noise.
The sampling resolution and sampling frequency were known. The sampling resolution
was used to calculate the quantisation noise power, as shown in Equation 2.4.1. It was
assumed that the quantisation noise forms a small part of the total noise. A second
assumption was that the resolution of the analogue to digital converters was chosen large
enough to sample the noise on the sensor. An anti-aliasing filter prior to sampling was
assumed, resulting in zero mean, band limited Gaussian noise with a frequency band of
half of the sampling frequency (fs)[18].
σ2quan =
∆2
12
(2.4.1)
The noise added to the calculated sensor measurements had eight times more power,
σ2noise = 8σ
2
quan, than the quantisation noise and was assumed to be zero mean, band lim-
ited Gaussian noise with a frequency band of 0.5fs. A band limited white noise Simulink
block was used to add the noise to the sensors. This block adds a sample from a Gaussian
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distribution, as shown in Equation 2.4.2.
Sensor Noise = N (µ = 0, σ2 = (σ2noise)(0.5fs))
= N (µ = 0, σ2 = 4σ2quanfs)
(2.4.2)
The noise variance of the different sensor measurements captures are shown in Ap-
pendix A
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Chapter 3
Introduction to Classification
This chapter gives an introduction to classification, this include what classifiers do, how
they are trained and what criteria are commonly used to evaluate them. A survey of
available classification libraries is conducted and discussed. An overview of classification
techniques and a short list of the classifiers that will be used based on the requirements
and constraints of the upset detection problem are given. The sort listed classifiers are
described in detail. A comparison of the processing and memory requirements of the
different classifiers are made.
The information given by this chapter is important to provide the reader with the
necessary background on classification. This chapter is used to identify the classification
algorithms to be applied to the upset detection problem. It is also used to identify the
general approach that will be used to design and verify the classifiers, this include sample
generation, labelling, training and testing of the classifiers. This chapter is used to identify
the criteria that will be used to evaluate the performance of the classifiers applied to the
upset detection problem. And the chapter is lastly used to identify which classifiers will
be more feasible to implement within the processing and memory constraints of a flight
computer.
The chapter starts with an introduction to classification. The classifier training and
typical classification evaluation process is described. A study of the available machine
learning libraries is presented. The working of the investigated classification algorithms
are presented and discussed. A computational complexity and memory use study for each
classifier is presented.
3.1 Classification in Upset Detection
Classification is part of a branch of machine learning called supervised learning. This
method is used to determine the category (class) that a new observation (sample) belongs
to based on the sample’s features[19]. This categorisation is done on the basis of a training
data set containing observations of which the class is known.
There exist three main categories of classification algorithms, namely novelty detection
classification, binary classification and multi-class classification. These three categories
of classification can be seen as classifiers trained to identify one, two or multiple classes
respectively. A novelty detection classifier is trained on only one class. Presented with an
unknown sample, the classifier calculates the similarity to the known class, and classifies
according to this similarity. A binary classifier is trained on data containing two classes.
All the samples used to train the classifiers should belong to either of the classes. A
27
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multi-class classifier is trained to identify two or more classes. This is done by training
on data containing multiple known classes.
Each classifier category can be divided into two subcategories: non-ensemble and
ensemble. Non-ensemble classifiers are algorithms that fit a single classifier or model to
the training data. Ensemble classifiers are classifiers that combine multiple non-ensemble
classifiers into a single classifier.[20].
The main advantage of non-ensemble classifiers are that they are not as computation-
ally complex as ensemble classifiers. The main disadvantage of non-ensemble classifiers is
that they are more prone to over-fitting because they fit the data to a single underlying
model and therefore lose generality. Over-fitting is a term used to describe a trained clas-
sifier that is fitted too tightly to the training data. This results in poor classifier accuracy,
i.e. in classifying observations that are not part of the training data set.[21].
Ensemble classifiers fit multiple classifiers to the training data and combine the classi-
fiers’ outputs into a single class output. The main advantage of ensemble classifiers is that
they gain generality by fitting the data to multiple underlying models and therefore are
less prone to over-fitting than non-ensemble classifiers. The main disadvantage of ensem-
ble classifiers is that their computational complexity increases because they implement
and combine multiple classifiers.
Classification as a technique of upset detection was one of the main goals of this
project. It was therefore important to investigate as large as possible variety of classifi-
cation algorithms from one of the classification algorithm categories.
Binary classifiers provide the biggest variety of classification algorithms that rely on a
wide variety of different assumptions and, were therefore investigated instead of novelty
detection or multi-class classifiers. The focus for the choices of classifiers is to test a wide
variety of classifiers that rely on different assumptions. Classifiers of different complexities
were investigated. The complexity of the classifiers was taken into consideration, since the
upset detection system needs to be implemented on a flight computer. Upset detection
can be considered a binary classification problem, as data can be classified into two classes,
namely upset and non-upset. For each different type of upset, for example angle of attack
upset, underspeed upset, or dynamic pitch upset, a separate binary classifier is trained to
detect the specific type of upset. The outputs of each separate upset detection classifier
can then be combined to detect and identify different upsets. This study investigated
both non-ensemble and ensemble classifiers.
3.2 Classifier Training
A non-linear simulation model, with a complete aerodynamic model of an Airbus A330 as
discussed in the previous chapter, are available to generate the training and testing data
for the classifiers. There is therefore no limit on the amount of the classifier training data
available. The simulation model gives the ability to generate data specifically for binary
classifier training for a given upset type.
The classifiers were trained on an equal number of observations from each of two
classes, to ensure that the classifiers are unbiased. The training data set must be large
enough to ensure that the classifiers are properly trained. A learning curve was used for
the purpose of determining the optimal size for the training data set, since a learning
curve shows classifier accuracy in relation to the size of the data set. If the training
data set is too small, then the classifier will not be trained properly, and will have poor
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classification accuracy. If the training data set is too large unnecessary effort is expended
in the training process.
3.3 Classifier Evaluation
The main evaluation parameter of classifiers is the percentage of correct classifications,
also known as classifier accuracy. There are two types of correct detections, namely
true positives and true negatives. True positives are upset samples that are correctly
classified as upset and true negatives are non-upset samples that are correctly classified
as non-upset. There are two types of incorrect classifications, namely false positives and
false negatives. False positives are non-upset samples that are incorrectly classified as
upset and therefore represent false alarms. False negatives are upset samples that are
incorrectly classified as non-upset samples and therefore represent missed detections. A
confusion matrix aggregates all of these variables into one matrix that is used to evaluate
a classifier’s accuracy. An example of a confusion matrix is shown in Table 3.1 [21].
Table 3.1: Confusion matrix layout
Predicted Non-Upset Predicted Upset
Actual Non-Upset True negative False positive
Actual Upset False negative True positive
The majority of classifier outputs are usually a probability value representing a class,
i.e. a probability of zero represents non-upset whereas a probability of one represents
upset. Classifiers apply a threshold on this probability to classify an observation to a
certain class. A classifier can therefore be biased towards a certain class by selecting
a threshold that will produce more predictions of one class. Unbiased classifiers were
investigated for the purpose of this study, the probability threshold that produce an equal
number of false alarms and missed detections was therefore needed. A receiver operator
characteristic (ROC) curve is used to determine the percentage of false alarms versus the
percentage of missed detections at different thresholds, as shown in Figure 3.1. A ROC
curve shows the percentage of false alarms and missed detections at different probability
thresholds. The threshold that produces equal percentages of false alarms and missed
detections is shown in the figure, the probability threshold for this case was 0.5. An equal
error rate (ERR) is when equal percentages of false alarms and missed detections are
produced.
A decision boundary is the boundary that separates the two classes, and is created
during the classifier training process. These boundaries differ from classifier to classifier
and when visualised give great insight into the operation of the classifiers. A decision
boundary for a two-dimensional classification problem is used to visualise the differences
between the classifiers in this chapter.
3.4 Machine Learning Library Selection
An open source machine learning library was used to identify the top-preforming classi-
fiers. This was decided in order to eliminate obviously poor-performing classifiers, thus
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Figure 3.1: An example receiver operator characteristic curve is shown with the equal
error rate producing threshold.
saving development time. The top-performing classifiers could then implemented in the
programming language of choice.
Many different open-source machine learning libraries are available in many different
programming languages. Table 3.2 shows the machine learning libraries considered for
this project,
Table 3.2: Machine learning libraries considered in this project
Name Supported By Language
WEKA University of Waikato Java
Scikit-learn Community Project,
French Institute of
Research in Computer
Science and Automation
(INRIA) took leadership.
Python
Eureqa Formalize Nutonian (Not open
source, but free student
licence)
Proprietary program,
able to export mathe-
matical models to any
programming language.
MLlib Apache Spark Apache Spark pipelines,
(supports Java, Python,
Scala)
PyLearn2 Community Project,
LISA-lab (University of
Montreal)
Python
Statistics and Machine
Learning Toolbox
MATLAB (Not open
source)
MATLAB
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The main criteria for selection of the machine learning library were,
- A large variety of classifiers available
- An easy implementation of the available classifiers (a scripting language is preferred)
- A high configurability of the available classifiers
- An open-source library
- A well documented API.
Scikit-learn was used for the implementation of the classifiers. Scikit-learn is a Python
module integrating a wide range of state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms. A ma-
chine learning library in Python was chosen due to the benefits of a scripting/interpreted
language, helping with the quick and easy implementation of the classification algorithms.
Its documented API and the fact that it features numerous classifier training configura-
tion parameters also motivated the selection of this library. It is distributed under the
simplified Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license [22]. The default classifier con-
figurations were initially used to identify the top-performing classifiers. Scikit-learn offers
access to multiple training configuration parameters for the training of the classifiers. A
random search within the configuration parameter space was conducted to determine the
classifiers’ sensitivity to the training parameters, as well as the quality of the default
configuration’s accuracy. Scikit-learn was used to reduce the time spent on the imple-
mentation of classifiers, allowing more time for the generation of the training data and
the training of classifiers.
3.5 Non-ensemble Classification
The non-ensemble classifiers used are presented and discussed in this section. The inves-
tigated classifiers make use of different fundamental assumptions or classification models
that vary in complexity. Since classifier accuracy varies considerably with type of classi-
fication problem, a number of different classifiers were tested to ensure the most suitable
classifier for upset detection is chosen. The non-ensemble classifiers that were applied to
the upset detection problem are shown in Table 3.3,
Table 3.3: Non-ensemble classifiers investigated
Classifier Name Classifier Characteristics
k-Nearest Neighbour (knn) Instance-based classification
Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier (NB) Probabilistic classification model
Logistic Regression Classifier (LR) Generalised linear model
Support Vector Machine (SVM) Distance-based classification
Decision Tree (DT) Rule-based classification
The table also shows the different classification models or assumptions used by the
classifiers. There is little research available on the use of classification for upset detection,
which is why it was decided to investigate a wide variety of classification models.
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3.5.1 k-Nearest Neighbour
3.5.1.1 Overview
The nearest neighbour classifier (knn) performs classification based on the shortest dis-
tance from the sample to be classified to the known samples on which the classifier was
trained. The distances from all the training samples to the unknown sample are calcu-
lated and the sample is classified according to the majority vote of a predefined number
(k) of shortest distances. Figure 3.3 shows the decision boundary for a two-dimensional
classification case.
Class A Sample
Class B Sample
Unknown Sample
dA1
dA2
dA3
dB1
dB2
dB3
Three shortest distances (k = 3)
Figure 3.2: The distances between an
unknown sample and the training sam-
ples. The three shortest distances are
shown in the shaded block.
Nearest Neighbour
Figure 3.3: Two-dimensional data clas-
sified with a k-nearest neighbour classi-
fier. The decision boundary is shown as
the blue line in the figure.
3.5.1.2 Training
A k-nearest neighbour classifier is an example of an instance-based learning technique.
The classifier uses the actual training data and not a model of the data. There is therefore
no classifier training: the storing of the training data in memory can be regarded as the
training.
3.5.1.3 Classification
The distances from a training sample to the unknown sample are calculated and used to
classify an unknown sample [23]. The sample is classified according to the majority vote
of a predefined number (k) of shortest distances.
Figure 3.2 shows the classification process for a knn classifier with k=3 and the Eu-
clidean distance used, with the unknown sample then classified as belonging to class A.
3.5.1.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
64-bit floating point precision was used to store the training data, this requires eight
bytes. The memory required for classification is therefore 8dN bytes, with d features and
N training samples. It is clear that the memory use of the nearest neighbour classifier
grows linearly with the number of training samples. The brute force method of calculating
the nearest neighbours is the most computationally complex with, a complexity of O(dN).
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Making use of space partitioning such as the K-D tree can reduce the average complexity
to O(logN).
3.5.1.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the knn classifier is its conceptual and computational simplicity. The
main disadvantage is that the knn classifier is memory-intensive when trained on large
data sets [24].
3.5.1.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn training configuration parameters are,
- The number of neighbours used in the majority vote
- The nearest neighbour algorithm used
- The distance metric used.
The number of neighbours used by the classifier can be set, with the default used being
five neighbours. The number of neighbours will have a smoothing effect on the decision
boundary proportional to the number of neighbours. There is an upper bound where
classifier accuracy is reduced by the number of neighbours added to the voting proses.
Several algorithms are included in the library to determine the nearest neighbours.
The brute force method involves the computation of the distance between all pairs of
points in the data set. The brute force method may be a worthwhile option for small data
sets, but becomes impractical for large data sets. In order to address the computational
inefficiencies of the brute force method, a variety of tree-based structures have been in-
vented. These trees operate on the assumption that if it is known that points X and Y
are far from each other, and that points Y and Z are close to each other, then it can be
assumed that points X and Z are far from each other. The two tree structures included in
the Scikit-learn library are a K-D tree and a Ball tree. The construction of the K-D tree
is fast, but becomes inefficient as the number of features grows. Ball trees on the other
hand are costly to construct, but can be very efficient on highly-structured data, even for
many features. The number of features (sensor measurements) used for upset detection
is relatively small, making the K-D tree the preferred option.
Numerous popular distance metrics are available to be used with the knn classifi-
cation algorithm. The distance metrics available are euclidean, manhattan, chebyshev,
minkowski and mahalanobis.
3.5.2 Na¨ıve Bayes
3.5.2.1 Overview
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is based on the probabilistic model derived from Bayes’ theorem
[25]. It calculates the probability that a sample belongs to a class based on each of
its feature value probabilities. The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier assumes feature independence
when calculating probabilities. This assumption that features are independent is why the
classifier is called “na¨ıve” [24]. Some features used for upset detection are not independent
of each other, and this might influence the performance of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier.
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Figure 3.4 shows the decision boundary for the two-dimensional data. The classifier
assumes a Gaussian distribution, as can be seen in the figure.
Na¨ıve Bayes
x1
x
2
Class A
Class B
p(x1|B)
p(x1|A)
p(x2|B)
p(x2|A)
p(Ux2 |A)
p(Ux1 |A)
p(Ux2 |B)
p(Ux1 |B)
Figure 3.4: Two dimensional data classified with a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. The decision
boundary is shown as the blue line in the figure. The feature distributions are also shown.
3.5.2.2 Training
Axes-independent Gaussian distributions are assumed for the spread of the classes. This
implies a diagonal covariance matrix. The classifier training process consists of determin-
ing the description of the Gaussian distributions that fits the data belonging to each of the
two classes. The variance (σ) and mean (µ) are calculated in each feature dimension of
the training data. The training process fits conditional probabilities to the data given the
class, as shown by the one-dimensional Gaussian distributions (p(x1|A), p(x1|B), p(x2|A)
and p(x2|B)) in Figure 3.4.
3.5.2.3 Classification
The probability of a sample belonging to a class can be calculated using Bayes’ theorem
and the independence assumption shown in Equation 3.5.1,
p(U¯ |y) =
d∏
i=1
p(Ui|y), (3.5.1)
with U¯ being a d-feature unknown sample. Figure 3.4 shows the conditional proba-
bilities of the two-dimensional unknown sample (U) with the following labels, p(Ux1 |A),
p(Ux2 |A), p(Ux1 |B), p(Ux2 |B).
The probability distribution of an unknown sample given the class is calculated for
both classes using Equation 3.5.1, as shown in Equations 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
p(U¯ |A) = p(Ux1 |A)p(Ux2 |A) (3.5.2)
p(U¯ |B) = p(Ux1 |B)p(Ux2 |B) (3.5.3)
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The probability of a class given the unknown sample is calculated using Equations 3.5.2
and 3.5.3 and Bayes’ theorem, as shown in Equations 3.5.4 and 3.5.5.
p(A|U¯) = ηp(U¯ |A)p(A), (3.5.4)
p(B|U¯) = ηp(U¯ |B)p(B). (3.5.5)
with η being the scaling coefficient.
The sample is classified into one of the two classes based on the conditional prob-
abilities calculated in Equations 3.5.4 and 3.5.5. The unknown sample is classified as
belonging to the class for which it has the largest conditional probability. This example
can be extended to d features.
3.5.2.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory footprint of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is small compared to the other clas-
sifiers. The mean and variance for each dimension are the only parameters that needs to
be stored. It can be shown that the memory required by the classifier is 16d bytes, if the
mean and variance are stored as 64-bit floating point precision, where d is the number of
features. The memory required does not increase with an increase in the number of train-
ing samples. The computational complexity for the classification of an unknown sample
grows linearly with the number features used, O(d).
3.5.2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is that training and classification of data
are simple to execute with little computational complexity, which makes it ideal to be
executed on a platform with little computational resources available. The disadvantage
of the Naive Bayes classifier is that it assumes independence between the features used
for the classification, which may not be a valid assumption, and this may lead to poor
classifier performance.
3.5.2.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
There are no Scikit-Learn configuration parameters for a Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes classifier.
3.5.3 Logistic Regression
3.5.3.1 Overview
Logistic regression calculates the relationship between a dependent variable and a number
of the independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic function. Logistic
regression is used as a classifier by applying a threshold to the estimate of the dependent
variable given the independent features. The class label of the sample is considered as
the dependant variable and the features of the samples are the independent variables. A
function with an output that lies between zero and one is needed to represent a binary
class. Logistic regression uses the logistic function shown in Equation 3.5.6 to estimate
the class label of the unknown samples [21],
hθ(x¯) =
1
1 + eθ¯T x¯
, (3.5.6)
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where θ¯ are the regression coefficients that need to be determined to ensure a well-fitted
sigmoid function to the data. The independent feature values of the unknown sample are
given by the vector, x¯.
Figure 3.5 shows the decision boundary of the logistic regression classifier given a
two-dimensional classification case.
Logistic Regression
Figure 3.5: Two-dimensional data classified with a logistic regression classifier. The
decision boundary is shown as the blue line in the figure.
3.5.3.2 Training
The regression coefficients of the logistic function is calculated in the training process
by determining the minimum of a cost function. A convex cost function is necessary
to determine the regression coefficients, without the risk of the optimisation algorithm
converging at a local minimum. A convex function is a function with an absolute optimum.
Equation 3.5.7 shows the convex cost function used, with y being the label of the sample.
A gradient descent method is used to determine θ¯ that will result in J(θ) reaching an
absolute minimum, with the dimension of θ¯ being the dimension of the features used.
There are multiple gradient descent algorithms to minimise the cost function, J(θ)
Cost(hθ(x¯), y¯) = −y¯ log(hθ(x¯))− (1− y¯) log(1− hθ(x¯)), (3.5.7)
J(θ) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
Cost(hθ(x
i), yi).
Regulation of the θ is necessary to prevent over-fitting of the regression model. Scikit-
Learn offers L1 and L2 regularisation. L1 and L2 regularisation methods shrink the
estimate of θ towards zero relative to the maximum likelihood estimates. The L2 penalty
tends to shrink some coefficients to small but non-zero values [26], whereas L1 regulari-
sation shrinks most of the regression coefficients to exactly zero and with relatively little
change to the more important regression coefficients[27].
3.5.3.3 Classification
Classification is done by evaluating Equation 3.5.6 at the unknown sample. The output
of Equation 3.5.6 lies between 0 and 1, with 0 being non-upset and 1 being upset. A
threshold is applied to an output of 0.5, with all the values less than 0.5 being non-upset
and all the values greater than and equal to 0.5 being upset.
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3.5.3.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory required by the classifier is determined by the dimension of the regression
coefficients, θ¯. The dimension of the regression coefficients is the same as the number of
features used, and it can therefore be shown that the memory required by the classifier is
8d bytes. The computational complexity of the classifier depends mainly on the number
of features used per sample, indicated with O(d).
3.5.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the logistic regression approach is that the classification of an unknown
sample requires little computational resources. The disadvantages of the logistic regression
approach are that the classifier might over-fit if regulation is not adequately applied to
the classifier. The linear model might not hold well for complex non-linear models. The
two classes might be linearly inseparable, in which case the logistic regression classifiers
will not be able to classify the data.
3.5.3.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn training configuration parameters are,
- The regulation algorithms used on the regression coefficients
- The optimisation algorithm used
- The regulation strength used
- The maximum number of iterations used in the training
- The stopping criteria tolerance used.
L1 or L2 regularisation of the regression coefficients can be selected. The gradient
descent algorithms used on the cost function to determine the regression coefficients are
newton-cg, the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfard-Shanno algorithm (lbfgs) and Liblinear. The
regulation strength, C, can be changed to reduce over-fitting at the cost of performance.
The maximum number of iterations taken for the solvers to converge can be limited to
reduce training time. The tolerance for the stopping criteria can be changed.
3.5.4 Support Vector Machine
3.5.4.1 Overview
A sample can be seen as a point in a multidimensional space, with the number of di-
mensions equal to the number of features of the sample. The model built by a support
vector machine (SVM) can be interpreted as a surface (hyperplane) separating the two
classes in this multidimensional space. The support vector machine is a learning method
that attempts to fit this hyperplane for optimal separation between the two classes. A
hyperplane’s position is typically determined by the maximum distance from both classes
[28].
Figure 3.6 shows two classes separated by a linear hyperplane for a two-dimensional
classification problem. The functional margin is the distance to the nearest data points of
any class. The hyperplane is chosen to fall in the middle of the largest functional margin.
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It turns into an optimisation problem to find the widest functional margin, as shown in
Figure 3.6.
Class A (x¯A) Class B (x¯B)
Linear Hyperplane
Functional Margin
x¯AFM
w¯
u¯
x¯BFM
x¯AFM − x¯BFM
Figure 3.6: Binary class classification using a SVM with a linear hyperplane. The
largest functional margin separating the two classes is shown.
3.5.4.2 Training
The support vector machine training process fits a hyperplane to separate the two classes
in the multidimensional feature space. The hyperplane is chosen to fall in the middle
of the largest functional margin. Lagrange multipliers are used to determine this largest
functional margin.
The projection of the known samples, x¯B and x¯A, on a vector perpendicular to the
hyperplane, w¯, is:
w¯ · x¯B + b ≥ 1, (3.5.8)
w¯ · x¯A + b ≤ −1. (3.5.9)
where b is an arbitrary threshold.
For the sake of convenience, let us define yi for the two classes:
yi =
{
1, for Class samples B
−1, for Class samples A
(3.5.10)
Combining Equations 3.5.8, 3.5.9 and 3.5.10 results in a general expression for the
projection of the known samples (x¯i) on w¯, as shown in Equation 3.5.11:
yi(x¯i · w¯ + b) ≥ 0. (3.5.11)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION 39
For the samples that lie on the boundary of the functional margin (support vectors),
x¯iFM , –shown in Figure 3.6– Equation 3.5.11 can be simplified to Equations 3.5.12 or
3.5.13.
yi(x¯iFM · w¯ + b)− 1 = 0, (3.5.12)
¯xiFM · w¯ =
{
1− b, for Class B
1 + b, for Class A
. (3.5.13)
An expression for the width of the functional margin, FMwidth, is shown in Equation 3.5.14.
FMwidth = (x¯AFM − x¯BFM ) ·
w¯
‖w¯‖
. (3.5.14)
Combining Equations 3.5.13 and 3.5.14, the width can be expressed as Equation 3.5.15,
FMwidth =
2
‖w¯‖
. (3.5.15)
To determine the maximum width of the functional margin, it is necessary to de-
termine the maximum of Equation 3.5.15, or similarly determine the minimum of ‖w¯‖.
Determining min 1
2
‖w¯‖2 makes it possible to determine the extreme minimum by using
Lagrange multipliers shown in Equation 3.5.16, with Equation 3.5.12 as the constraint for
the optimisation problem [29].
L(w¯, b) =
1
2
‖w¯‖2 −
∑
i
αi[yi(w¯ · x¯iFM + b)− 1] (3.5.16)
where L() is the Lagrange function and αi is a Lagrange multiplier.
The turning point of Equation 3.5.16 is shown in Equation 3.5.17,
∇(w¯,b)L(w¯, b) = 0⇔
{
w¯ −
∑
i αiyix¯iFM = 0
−
∑
i αiyi = 0
. (3.5.17)
It is clear from Equation 3.5.17 that,
w¯ =
∑
i
αiyix¯iFM (3.5.18)
Substituting Equation 3.5.18 into Equation 3.5.16 yields,
L(w¯, b) =
1
2
(
∑
i
αiyix¯iFM )(
∑
j
αjyjx¯jFM )−
∑
i
αiyix¯iFM ·(
∑
j
αjyjx¯jFM )−
∑
i
αiyib+
∑
i
αi
, which can be simplified by using Equation 3.5.17, as shown in Equation 3.5.19,
L(w¯, b) =
∑
i
αi −
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
αiαjyiyjx¯iFM · x¯jFM (3.5.19)
The optimisation problem is reduced to finding the maximum of x¯iFM · x¯jFM .
In some cases the training samples might be linearly inseparable and the optimi-
sation algorithms will not be able to find a maximum for x¯iFM · x¯jFM . The samples
can be transformed with a transformation function, φ(x¯), into a different space so that
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a optimal hyperplane can be fitted. The optimisation still depends on a dot product,
therefore as long as φ(x¯i) · φ(x¯j) can be determined it is not necessary to determine the
actual transformation function. It is thus only necessary to optimise the kernel function,
K(x¯i, x¯j) = φ(x¯i) · φ(x¯j), to find the support vectors and classify unknown samples. Ap-
plying a kernel results in the shape of the hyperplane changing when transformed back to
the original sample space, as shown in Figure 3.7 for a two-dimensional case. Figure 3.7
shows the effect of different kernels on the decision boundary of a SVM classifier [28].
Linear Kernel RBF Kernel Polynomial Kernel
Figure 3.7: Two-dimensional data classified with SVMs using different kernels. The
decision boundary is shown as the blue line in the figure.
3.5.4.3 Classification
Let w¯ be a vector that is perpendicular to the hyperplane and u¯ be a vector to an
unknown sample, as shown in Figure 3.6. The projection of u¯ onto w¯ is calculated with
a dot product and compared with a threshold, as shown in Equation 3.5.20. With the
threshold, b, and w¯ it is possible to classify the unknown sample.
w¯ · u¯+ b ≥ 0
{
then Class B
else Class A
(3.5.20)
3.5.4.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory and computational complexity of the support vector machine depend on the
kernel used. The linear support vector machine is similar to the logistic regression clas-
sifiers in terms of memory use and computational complexity, with the memory required
being 8d bytes and the computational complexity to evaluate an unknown sample being
O(d). Memory and computational requirements increase with the number of support
vectors used in the classifier. It can be shown that the memory required for a classifier
using a kernel is 8dnsv bytes with nsv being the number of support vectors used. The
computational complexity of a classifier using a kernel is O(nsvd) and can usually be
simplified to O(d2).
3.5.4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of the support vector machine approach are that the use of kernel func-
tions makes it possible to transform linearly inseparable data into linearly separable data
that can be classified. Support vector machines are defined by a convex optimisation
problem, removing the risk of converging on local minima. The disadvantages of the
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support vector machine are that the solving of the optimisation problem for the classifier
training is computationally intensive, which means that training the classifier on large
data sets may require a lot of computational resources. The optimisation step might not
be able to converge to an answer. The selection of the correct kernel may require a large
amount of human input that might be considered as a disadvantage.
3.5.4.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn training configuration parameters are,
- A penalty parameter on misclassified data
- The kernels used
- Multiple kernel parameters
- The maximum number of iterations used for training.
A penalty parameter on misclassified samples can be adjusted to force a tight fit to
the training data. Over-fitting might appear for large penalties on misclassified data.
Kernels are used to transform the samples into a different sample space. These four
kernel functions were investigated for the upset detection problem,
- Linear kernel
K(x¯i, x¯j) = x¯
T
i x¯j
- Polynomial kernel
K(x¯i, x¯j) = (γx¯
T
i x¯j + r)
d
- Radial basis function
K(x¯i, x¯j) = e
(−γ|x¯i−x¯j |
2)
- Sigmoid kernel
K(x¯i, x¯j) = tanh(γx¯
T
i x¯j + r)
These kernels are commonly used in classification with support vector machines, and
were therefore tested for the given upset detection problem. It is possible to specify a
custom kernel specific to the problem. Custom kernels can influence the performance of
the classifier drastically and may require a vast amount of fiddling to achieve good results.
The focus of this project was to investigate the feasibility of classifiers for upset detection,
and custom kernels were therefore considered to be outside of the scope of this project.
Different parameters within the kernel functions can be adjusted to shape the kernel
function. Parameters that can be adjusted are γ, r and d, depending on the kernel
function. The maximum iterations for the optimisation are also adjustable [30].
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3.5.5 Decision Tree
3.5.5.1 Overview
A decision tree (DT) is a learning method which constructs a tree of decisions based
on training data. The fitted classification model consists of a recursive tree of rules
[31]. These rules are easily visualised and interpreted by a human. Figure 3.8 shows the
decision boundary for a two-dimensional classification problem, and Figure 3.9 shows its
corresponding tree.
Decision Tree
Figure 3.8: Two-dimensional data clas-
sified with a decision tree. The decision
boundary is shown as the blue line in the
figure.
x ≤ 0.036
y ≤ −0.50 Class A
Class Bx ≤ −0.74
Class AClass B
Figure 3.9: The decision tree that
generated the decision boundary in Fig-
ure 3.8.
3.5.5.2 Training
The Scikit-Learn library uses the CART (Classification and Regression Tree) algorithm
to construct decision trees. The CART algorithm generates binary splits and considers
only one feature at a time. The splitting criterion is the information gain from the parent
node to the two child nodes. The information gain is the difference in the impurity degree
of the parent node and the child nodes after a split is made. The impurity degree is
a measure of the homogeneity of the variables within a set, and the impurity degree
shows the quality of the split made. The CART algorithm uses entropy or the Gini index
as impurity degree measures to calculate the information gain [32]. Information gain is
shown in Equation 3.5.21 with L = {left node, right node} for classes A and B,
IG(S) = Impurity of parent−
∑
i∈L
nAi + nBi
nA + nB
Impurity of child(i). (3.5.21)
where n() is the number of samples for a given class and node.
The entropy for class A and class B is shown in Equation 3.5.22, with p(A) the
probability of class A,
H(p(A), p(B)) = −p(A) ln(p(A))− p(B) ln(p(B)). (3.5.22)
The Gini index for class A and class B is shown in Equation 3.5.23, with p(A) the
probability of class A,
G(p(A), p(B)) = 1− (p(A)2 + p(B)2) (3.5.23)
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.
The information gains for the two impurity degree measures are shown in Equa-
tions 3.5.24 and 3.5.25
I(S) = H(
nA
nA + nB
,
nB
nA + nB
)−
∑
i∈L
nAi + nBi
nA + nB
H(
nAi
nAi + nBi
,
nBi
nAi + nBi
) (3.5.24)
I(S) = G(
nA
nA + nB
,
nB
nA + nB
)−
∑
i∈L
nAi + nBi
nA + nB
G(
nAi
nAi + nBi
,
nBi
nAi + nBi
) (3.5.25)
The split, S, used to calculate the information gain, is a binary split on a single feature.
Features are randomly selected, and the split values on the feature are selected at fixed
intervals or at random values within the feature’s range. The split with the maximum
information gain is used, and the process is repeated for the next layer of the tree [33].
The tree is fully grown using the information gains at different splits. The grown
tree is then pruned to reduce over-fitting, thus improving the generalisation of the tree.
The pruning is done on predefined stopping criteria, like maximum tree depth, minimum
number per leaf, minimum samples per split or maximum number of leaf nodes [33].
3.5.5.3 Classification
The tree of rules is applied to the unknown sample. The rules classify the sample into
one of the two classes.
3.5.5.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory required by the decision tree grows with the number of splits made in the
tree, and is proportional to the depth of the tree. The maximum amount of memory used
by the tree is dependent on the depth of the tree, 8(2(Tree Depth)−1) bytes. This amount of
memory is for a symmetrical tree, which is the worst case. If the tree is asymmetrical that
will result in less memory being used. The absolute worst computational complexity for a
symmetrical decision tree is O(2(Tree Depth)), and the mean complexity for a symmetrical
tree is O(log 2(Tree Depth)). If the decision trees are not symmetrical, that will result in a
less complex classifier.
3.5.5.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of decision trees are that they are easily interpreted by humans, making
them an intuitive way to classify data. A decision tree translates to a sequential list of
if-statements that can be easily implemented on a computer. The major disadvantage of
a decision tree is that it is prone to over-fitting, if it is insufficiently pruned.
3.5.5.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn training configuration parameters are,
- The type of impurity degree measure used
- The maximum number of features used
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- The maximum depth of the tree
- The minimum samples per leaf
- The minimum samples to split an internal node.
The impurity degree measures used by the Scikit-Learn library as splitting criteria are
Gini index and entropy. The maximum number of features used for the training of the
classifiers can be selected, with the default being all the features. The pruning parameters
available to reduce over-fitting are the maximum depth of the tree, the minimum samples
per leaf, the minimum number of samples required to split an internal node, and the
maximum number of leaf nodes.
3.6 Ensemble Classification
Ensemble classification combines a number of classifiers into a single classifier. Over-
fitting is reduced with ensemble classification, through the use of multiple classifiers to
classify the same sample. Ensemble classifiers use majority vote, weighted average or
a mean to combine the output of multiple classifiers. The classifiers can be trained on
varying versions of the training data, or different classifiers can be trained on the same
training data. The ensemble classifiers investigated in this study are shown in Table 3.4,
Table 3.4: Ensemble classifiers investigated.
Classifier Name Classifier Characteristics
AdaBoost (Boost) Classifiers trained on boosted sets of
training data
Random Forest (RF) Multiple decision trees trained on sub-
sets of training data
Bagging Classifier (Bag) Classifiers trained on subsets of train-
ing data
Multi-Classifier System (MCS) A variety of classifiers combined into
one classifier
3.6.1 AdaBoost Classifier
3.6.1.1 Overview
An AdaBoost classifier fits a sequence of weak learners (low complexity), which performs
just better than random guessing, on repeatedly modified versions of the data. The
predictions are combined through a weighted majority vote to produce the final prediction.
The modifications consist of applying weights to each training sample. The initial weak
learner is trained on the original data. For the successive iterations, the weights are
individually modified to emphasise the missed detections [34].
Figure 3.10 shows the decision boundary for the two-dimensional classification case,
using an AdaBoost classifier. The Adaboost classifier in Figure 3.10 used a decision tree
as its base classifier.
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AdaBoost Classifier
Figure 3.10: Two-dimensional data classified with an AdaBoost classifier using a de-
cision tree as the base classifier. The decision boundary is shown as the blue line in the
figure.
3.6.1.2 Training
Figure 3.11 shows the training process for the AdaBoost classifier using a linear SVM as
the base classifier. This training scheme reduces the chance of over-fitting, by using a
collective of classifiers.
Multiple iterations of weighted data Final Classifier
Figure 3.11: The process of training an AdaBoost classifier using a linear SVM classifier
as the base classifier. The decision boundaries for the different iterations with weighted
samples are shown.
Let the label yi of a sample be in the labelset Y = {−1,+1} and the weights of the
training samples be denoted as w
(m)
i . The AdaBoost algorithm calls the base learning
algorithm (h(m)(x¯i)) repeatedly in a series of rounds m = 1, . . . ,M . The performance of
the weak learner is measured by its error, as shown in Equation 3.6.1. A weak learner
is expected to perform just better than random guessing, err(m) < 0.5. The AdaBoost
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
err(m) =
max∑
i:h(m)(x¯i)6=yi
w
(m)
i (3.6.1)
It is clear from the weak learner weight update in Algorithm 1 that α(m) > 0 and that
α(m) gets larger as err(m) gets smaller.
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Algorithm 1 AdaBoost Training Algorithm [35]
1. Initialise the observation weights w
(1)
i =
1
n
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
2. For m = 1 to M
a) Fit classifier, h(m)(x¯i) to the training data using weights w
(m)
i
b) Compute error:
err(m) =
∑
i:h(m)(x¯i)6=yi
w
(m)
i
c) Compute base classifier weight:
α(m) =
1
2
ln(
1− err(m)
err(m)
)
d) Compute weight normalisation factor Z(m):
Z(m) = 2
√
err(m)(1− err(m))
e) Compute next step observation weights:
w
(m+1)
i =
w
(m)
i
Z(m)
e−α
(m)yih
(m)(x¯i)
3. Output of the final classifier:
H(x¯) = sign(
M∑
m=1
α(m)h(m)(x¯i))
3.6.1.3 Classification
The output of the final classifier and can be taken as the weighted majority vote of all
the trained classifiers in Equation 3.6.2,
H(x¯) = sign(
M∑
m=1
α(m)h(m)(x¯i)). (3.6.2)
The base classifiers, h(m)(x¯), classify the data, as previously discussed.
3.6.1.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory usage and computational complexity of the AdaBoost classifier are depen-
dent on the memory requirements and computational complexity of the base classifier as
well as the number of base classifiers, M, used. The memory required is therefore M ×
(Memory of base classifier) and the complexity is O(M(Complexity of base classifier)).
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3.6.1.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the AdaBoost classifier is that it generalises well, reducing the change
of over-fitting. The disadvantage is that the computational complexity might, however,
be high for complex base classifiers.
3.6.1.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn classifier training configuration parameters are,
- The boosting training algorithm used
- The base classifier used
- The number of base classifiers used.
The two boosting training algorithms available are the SAMME and SAMME-R
(Stage-wise Additive Modelling using a Multi-class Exponential loss function) algorithms
[36]. SAMME and SAMME-R are multi-class boosting algorithms. The SAMME algo-
rithm is the same as Algorithm 1 for binary classification. The SAMME-R algorithm uses
weighted probability estimates to update the additive model, rather than the classifica-
tions themselves.
The base classifier can be selected; in this case decision tree classifiers were used as base
classifiers. Training the decision trees is fast compared to a SVM, and the classification
is computationally inexpensive. AdaBoost classifiers perform best when constructed with
simple learners, like shallow decision trees. The number of classifiers in the ensemble can
be selected.
3.6.2 Random Forest
3.6.2.1 Overview
The random forest classifier (RF) is an averaging of randomised tree algorithms using a
perturb-and-combine technique specifically designed for trees. A diverse set of classifiers
is created by introducing randomness into the classifier training. Figure 3.12 shows the
decision boundary of the random forest for a two-dimensional classification case.
Random Subsets of data with decision trees Random Forest
Figure 3.12: Two-dimensional data classified with a random forest classifier. The
decision boundary is shown as the blue line in the figure. Some trained decision trees on
subsets of the data are shown.
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3.6.2.2 Training
A random forest classifier fits a number of decision trees on various subsets of the training
data set[37]. These subsets are subsets of the feature space and the training samples. The
split of a node is picked based on the best split within the subset of features, resulting in
a slightly biased classifier. Averaging of the classifiers compensates for this bias. Trained
decision trees, on subsets of the data and the features of the data, are shown in Figure 3.12.
3.6.2.3 Classification
An unknown sample is classified by each of the trained decision tree classifiers. The
decision tree class outputs are combined by averaging the class prediction of the decision
trees.
3.6.2.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
A random forest is an ensemble of trees. The memory usage of the random forest is
therefore the product of the number of trees in the forest and the memory per tree. It can
be shown that the maximum memory required by the random forest is 8M(2(Tree Depth)−
1) bytes. The maximum complexity of the forest is scaled with the trees within the
forest, O(M2(Tree Depth)) at the worst and O(M log 2(Tree Depth)) as the mean maximum
complexity.
3.6.2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of random forest classifiers are that they handle large training data sets
considerably well, due to the bagging of the training data. The classifiers do not require
linear features or even features that behave linearly. The main disadvantage of random
forests is that they tend to over-fit on noisy training data.
3.6.2.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
All the configuration parameters for the decision trees are available for this classifier. The
number of classifiers can be selected, with the default being ten decision trees. Bootstrap
samples are used when building the tree, but can be disabled.
3.6.3 Bagging Classifier
3.6.3.1 Overview
A bagging (bag) classifier trains classifiers on random subsets or “bags” of the data [38].
All the features are used to train the base classifiers. The bagging classifier combines the
individual decision tree classifiers’ predictions by averaging them [39]. Figure 3.13 shows
the decision boundary for a bagging classifier containing ten decision trees.
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Random Subset of the data with decision trees
Bagging Classifier
Figure 3.13: Two-dimensional data classified with a bagging classifier. The decision
boundary is shown as the blue line in the figure. Some trained decision trees on subsets
of the data are shown.
3.6.3.2 Training
This process is shown in Figure 3.13. The subset samples are drawn with replacement,
known as bootstrapping. Multiple base classifiers are trained on the subsets of the training
data. The trained base classifiers are aggregated into one ensemble classifier. Aggregation
can be a majority vote or average of the predicted classes. No weights are assigned to the
different base classifiers.
3.6.3.3 Classification
The classification process of the bagging classifier is the average of the ensemble base
classifiers or the majority vote of the different base classifiers. The classification done by
the base classifiers is exactly the same as what was described in the previous section for
the non-ensemble classifiers.
3.6.3.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The computational complexity and memory required by the bagging classifier are similar
to those of the AdaBoost classifier. The memory and computational requirements are
equal to the memory and computational complexity of the base classifier scaled with the
number of classifiers in the ensemble.
3.6.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the bagging classifiers is that over-fitting is reduced by using classifiers
trained on subsets of the whole training data set. Simple base classifiers can be combined
to form a classifier with high accuracy. The disadvantage of bagging classifiers is the
increase of the computational complexity as the product of the complexity of the base
classifier and the number of base classifiers used. A bagging classifier may require large
amounts of computational resources if a complex base classifier is used.
3.6.3.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The Scikit-learn classifier training configuration parameters are,
- The type of base classifier used
- The number of the base classifiers used
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- The number of features and samples drawn into the subsets.
The type and number of base classifiers can be changed, with the default being ten
decision tree classifiers. The number of samples and features drawn into the subsets can
be specified with the option of bootstrapping on the samples and features.
3.6.4 Multi Classifier System
3.6.4.1 Overview
A multi-classifier system (MCS) is a system that consists of multiple classifiers and a fu-
sion scheme to combine their predictions [40]. A MCS is analogous to a company’s board
of directors, where the board consists of people with different levels of qualifications and
expertise. Adding diversity of different learning paradigms improves the overall perfor-
mance of the classifier. The chance of over-fitting is also reduced. Figure 3.14 shows the
decision boundary for three base classifiers, as well as the decision boundary of the MCS.
Logistic Regression Bagging Classifier SVM Multi Classifier System
Figure 3.14: Two-dimensional data classified with a multi-classifier system containing
a logistic regression model, a bagging classifier and a SVM. The decision boundary is
shown as the blue line in the figure. The decision boundaries for the three base classifiers
are shown.
3.6.4.2 Training
The base classifiers are trained each according to their own training method, then com-
bined by taking the average of the predicted probabilities. Three classifiers relying on
different assumptions were combined in this project, since this offered good generality
while keeping computational resources low.
3.6.4.3 Classification
The base classifiers each perform their classification according to their base type. The
three predictions are combined by taking the average of the predicted class probabilities.
A probability greater than 0.5 is considered as upset and less than 0.5 is non-upset.
3.6.4.4 Sample Classification Computational Complexity Study
The memory required and the computational complexity of the multi-classifier system are
simply the sum of the memory and computational resources required by all the base classi-
fiers. The memory footprint is therefore
∑
(Memory of base classifier) and the complexity
is O(
∑
(Complexity of base classifier)).
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3.6.4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of combining multiple classifiers that rely on different assumptions results
in a classifier with little chance of over-fitting. The greatest disadvantage of the multi-
classifier system is the high amount of computational resources required to classify an
unknown sample. The accuracy of the multi-classifier system can be affected by one
inaccurate base classifier, due to the relatively small number of classifiers used.
3.6.4.6 Scikit-Learn Training Configuration Parameters
The type and number of base classifiers and the averaging weights for the base classifiers
can be specified. Uniform weights are used as the default configuration.
3.7 Summary of Computational Complexity of
Classifiers
Table 3.5 shows a summary of the memory usage and computational complexity of the
different classifiers. The nearest neighbour classifier is the only classifier of which the
complexity increases with the number of the training samples, N. The number of features
used influences the complexity of the Na¨ıve Bayes, logistic regression and support vector
machine classifiers. These features are bounded by the number of sensor measurements
used in the upset detection system. The complexity of the system therefore decreases for
the case where the anemometric sensors are not available. A support vector machine’s
complexity is dependent on the number of support vectors used to describe the hyperplane
separating the two classes. The complexity of the tree-based classifiers is dependent on
the depth of the trees. An ensemble classifiers’ complexity is the sum of all the base
classifiers in the ensemble and there is an overhead complexity added by the aggregation
of the base classifiers. The overhead is small in comparison with the complexity of the
base classifiers and is therefore ignored.
The memory requirement of the trained classifiers is dependent on the same parameters
as the computational complexity of the classifiers.
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Table 3.5: Summary of the classifiers’ memory requirements and computational com-
plexity to classify an unknown sample.
Classifier Memory Usage Classification Complexity
knn ≈ dN O(logN)
NB ≈ d O(d)
LR ≈ d O(d)
SVM ≈ dnsv O(nsvd)
DT ≈ 2(Tree Depth) O(log 2(Tree Depth))
Boost with DT ≈M2(Tree Depth) O(M log 2(Tree Depth))
RF ≈M2(Tree Depth) O(M log 2(Tree Depth))
Bagging with DT ≈M2(Tree Depth) O(M log 2(Tree Depth))
MCS with LR, SVM,
bagging
≈ (d + dnsv +
M2(Tree Depth))
O(d+ dnsv +M log 2
(Tree Depth))
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Chapter 4
Design of an Upset Detection System
This chapter presents the design and validation of an upset detection system for commer-
cial passenger airliners that uses classification algorithms operating on a combination of
anemometric and inertial sensor measurements. The system is an intelligent upset aware-
ness system that automatically detects and identifies aircraft upset conditions by using all
available on-board sensors. The objective of the system is to provide reliable awareness
and recognition of upset conditions to the pilot so that the correct recovery actions can
be taken.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the requirements and constraints of the
upset detection function are listed. Following the requirements, the conceptual design and
proposed architecture of the function are presented. Following this, the strategy that was
used to generate the training and testing data for the classifiers is described. Next, the
classifier training procedure is discussed. The classifier evaluation scheme is presented,
this includes capturing the classifier accuracies and determining the classifiers’ sensitivity
to training parameters. The classification accuracy of the upset detection functions are
also compared to the accuracy of estimation-based approaches. Next, the locations of the
false alarms and missed detections relative to the classification boundary are evaluated.
Finally, the upset detection function validation with simulated upset manoeuvres using a
representative flight dynamics model for a commercial passenger aircraft is presented.
4.1 System Requirements and Constraints
The following requirements and constraints were formulated for the upset detection sys-
tem:
- The system should be able to detect upset accurately and with a low probability of
a false alarm being generated in the normal flight domain.
- The system must use classification techniques to perform the upset detection.
- The system should perform the upset detection based on sensor data from the
anemometric and inertial sensors typically available on commercial passenger air-
craft.
- The system should be able to detect upset using only the inertial sensors when the
anemometric sensors are not available.
- The angle of attack upset detection system must be verified with representative
sensor noise and external wind disturbances.
53
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Figure 4.1: A system overview of the high angle of attack upset detection system
- False alarms should not occur in the normal flight domain, even amidst severe
environmental conditions.
- The upset detection system must be validated with simulated upset manoeuvres
(called ”validation manoeuvres”) using a representative flight dynamics model for
a commercial passenger aircraft.
The training data for the classifiers is constrained to simulated data, as generating
training data from actual flight upset events is not feasible. It is assumed that all the
sensors are available, or are known to be faulty, it is assumed that fault detection and
isolation is already performed at sensor level. The assumption is made that the inertial
sensors are always available and reliable. It is assumed that the anemometric sensors may
be lost, as anemometric sensors have a higher failure rate than inertial sensors, and a
system that has some sort of redundancy is investigated.
4.2 Conceptual Design and Architecture
The conceptual design and architecture of the proposed upset detection function is shown
in Figure 4.1. The upset detection function consists of two separate upset detection
classification sub-systems. The primary classifier used both anemometric and inertial
sensors to perform the classification, while the secondary classifier uses only the inertial
sensors. It is assumed that a fault detection and isolation (FDI) system is implemented
for the anemometric sensors. The FDI system is used to select between the two upset
detection classifiers. When all the sensors are operational, Classifier A is enabled, and
when faults are detected in the anemometric sensors, Classifier B is enabled.
The anemometric sensor measurements used by Classifier A are calibrated airspeed
(Vcas), angle of attack (α) and side-slip angle (β).
The inertial sensor measurements used are the attitude angles (φ, θ, ψ), angular rates
(P,Q,R), total body accelerations (ax, ay, az), altitude (Alt) and flight path angle (γ).
Both the classifiers use the same inertial sensor variables as inputs. These anemometric
and inertial measurements represent the sensor measurements that are typically available
on a commercial passenger airliner.
The upset detection function outputs a binary signal that represents either upset or
non-upset. The design and architecture presented in this section was followed for all upset
classes.
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4.3 Training Data Generation
The data set that was used for the classifier training and testing was generated from the
Airbus A330 simulation model.
Initially it was thought that the time histories of simulated upset manoeuvres, where
the aircraft is commanded to enter an upset condition, could be used to compile the
training data set. However, it was found that in such a simulated upset manoeuvre,
the aircraft spends most of the time in a non-upset condition, and only a very short
time in the upset condition. A data set compiled from time histories of simulated upset
manoeuvres would therefore contain many more examples of non-upset data points than
examples of upset data points. The data set is consequently heavily biased towards non-
upset data points, and a classifier trained on such a data set would therefore also have
a bias towards classifying data points as non-upset conditions. Another disadvantage of
a data set compiled from simulated upset manoeuvres it that it only covers the aircraft
states that were reached by the specific upset manoeuvres that were performed, and will
not necessarily cover the entire aircraft state space. A classifier trained on such a data
set would therefore be unlikely to correctly classify aircraft states that are not close to
those that were encountered in the simulated upset manoeuvres.
It was therefore decided to compile the data set with ”snapshots” of randomly gener-
ated aircraft states and their associated anemometric and inertial sensor measurements.
Using random ”snapshots” instead of a manoeuvre trajectory is a valid approach, because
the classification of an upset is based only on the current state of the aircraft, and not on
the time history of its previous states. Although a ”snapshot” of the aircraft state seems
like a static condition, it does however represent a dynamic condition due to the fact
that the state vector contains the translational velocities and angular rates of the aircraft
as state variables. Compiling the data set from randomly generated aircraft states has
several advantages. Firstly, the data set can be generated to contain an equal amount of
non-upset data points and upset data points. The data set would therefore be unbiased,
and a classifier trained on such a data set would consequently not be biased by the train-
ing data. Secondly, the data set can also be generated to cover the entire aircraft state
space, and not just the states that were reached by specific upset manoeuvres performed.
A classifier trained on such a data set could therefore be expected to correctly classify
data points from the entire state space of the aircraft.
The approach was adopted to train and test the classifiers on a data set compiled of
random ”snapshots”, but to then also validate the upset detection system in a dynamic
aircraft simulation with simulated upset manoeuvres
The data set with ”snapshots” of randomly generated aircraft states was compiled by
generating each data point as follows:
1. The Airbus A330 simulation model is initialised with a random state, a random set
of inputs, and a random set of atmospheric disturbances
2. The specific state variables that are randomly initialised are the aircraft’s attitude
(ψ, θ, φ), angular rates (P,Q,R), velocity vector (U,V,W) and the altitude. The spe-
cific inputs that are randomly initialised are the actuator deflections (δelv, δail, δrud),
thrust command. The specific disturbance is the wind vector (Uwind, Vwind,Wwind)
3. The sensor outputs from the anemometric and inertial sensors are calculated for
the given states, inputs, and disturbances, and then representative sensor noise is
added
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4. The generated data point is labelled as either ”non-upset” or ”upset” by comparing
it with the upset definitions.
A novel sampling strategy was used to generate the training and testing data set for
the classifiers. The random samples were generated to be a union of a wide uniform sample
distribution over the entire aircraft state space, and a tight normal distribution about the
upset boundary. The wide uniform sample distribution enables the classifier to correctly
identify non-upset and upset conditions that are far away from the upset boundary, while
the tight normal distribution enables the classifier to accurately discriminate between
non-upset and upset conditions close to the upset boundary.
4.4 Classifier Training
A number of different classifiers were trained on a data set to detect upset. The in-
vestigated classifiers were presented and discussed in depth in Chapter 3. The classifier
training process was as follows,
- The complete data set was separated into a set of training data and a set of testing
data, with 70% of the data set allocated for training and 30% of the data reserved
for testing
- The different classifiers were all trained on the same set of training data that con-
tained equal amounts of non-upset and upset data points.
- The classifiers were trained on data sets containing both anemometric and inertial
sensor measurements, and on data sets containing only the inertial sensor measure-
ments.
- The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the classifier were used to
select a probability threshold, to ensure that the classifiers function at an equal
error rate (EER) as discussed in Chapter 3. An example of a typical ROC curve
is shown in Figure 3.1. The comprehensive set of ROC curves for all the classifiers
can be seen in Appendices C to E.
- The learning curves of classifiers were determined and used to select the size of the
training set to ensure that all classifiers were correctly trained, neither under-trained
nor over-trained. The learning curves for the classifiers were determined by training
the classifiers on data sets of increasing size and plotting the percentage correct
detections against the number data points used.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of a learning curves for the high angle of attack upset
detection multi-classifier system for both sensor cases. The comprehensive set of learning
curves for all the different classifiers are shown in Appendices C to E. Learning curves
are commonly used to determine whether classifier training data sets are large enough to
ensure a sufficiently trained classifier. It can be seen from Figure 4.2 that the accuracy
of the classifier eventually flattens out, and that the confidence interval decreases, as the
training data set’s size increases, which indicates that a classifier is adequately trained.
For example a training data set of 5000 samples or greater would be sufficient for the
MCS in Figure 4.2.
Ensuring that all the classifiers are adequately trained allows for an even comparison
of classifier accuracies.
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Figure 4.2: The multi-classifier system’s learning curves for both sensor cases
4.5 Testing Classifier Accuracy
The different classifiers were then tested on the testing data set and their performances
as classifiers were evaluated. The accuracy of the classifiers were evaluated in terms of
total accuracy, 0.5× (%True Positives + %True Negatives), since the classifiers operated
at an EER which implies equal percentages of false alarms and missed detections.
Ten-fold Monte Carlo cross-validation was used to ensure that the classifier accuracy
results are independent from how the data set was partitioned into training data and
testing data. The complete data set was randomly separated into 70% training data and
30% testing data, but with the constraint that both data sets must contain equal amounts
of non-upset and upset data points. The classifier was then trained on the random set of
training data and tested on the random set of testing data. The training and testing cycle
was repeated ten times with random partitions each time, and then the average accuracy
of each classifiers over all ten cycles was calculated.
Each fold of the ten-fold Monte Carlo cross-validation was repeated ten times for all
the non-deterministic classifiers. This ensured that the classifier accuracy results are inde-
pendent from how the classifier training algorithms are initialised. The average accuracy
of each classifier was taken as the average for the combined repetitions of the ten-fold
cross-validation and the ten repetitions per cross-validation fold. The 95% confidence in-
tervals for all the accuracies shown were calculated with the accuracies achieved by these
repetitions.
A McNemar’s test was used to determine the statistical significance of classifiers with
overlapping confidence intervals. The test is used to determine whether the classifier test
set is large enough to show that the differences in classifier accuracies are statistically
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significant. Results were considered to be statistically significant for p-values smaller
than 0.05.
The McNemar’s test is shown by Equation 4.5.1 and Table 4.1. The discordants shown
by cells b and c in Table 4.1 are used to determine X 2 as shown in Equation 4.5.1. X 2 has
a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. If X 2 is significant (p < 0.05), the
test dataset was considered as large enough to show the differences in classifier accuracies.
Table 4.1: McNemar’s test - contingency table
Classifier A - Non-Upset Classifier A - Upset
Classifier B - Non-Upset a b
Classifier B - Upset c d
X 2 =
(b− c)2
b+ c
(4.5.1)
4.6 Classifier Sensitivity to Training Configuration
Parameters
An investigation was performed to explore the sensitivity of the classifier accuracies to the
training parameters that were used. For the tests performed in this chapter, the different
classifiers were trained using the default training parameters provided by Scikit-learn.
However, the training parameters can be tuned to optimise the classifier accuracy for the
specific classification problem. Experiments were performed where the classifiers were
trained with randomly initialised training parameters and then tested to determine the
classifier accuracies for each set of training parameters. The investigation was performed
to get an indication of the potential gain in classifier accuracy that could be obtained
by tuning the training parameters for optimal classifier performance, and also to get an
indication of the amount of tuning effort/expertise that would be required. The distribu-
tion of the classifier accuracies over the range of randomly initialised training parameters
indicates the potential gain as well as the tuning effort/expertise required. The train-
ing parameters that were randomly varied, with their associated ranges are shown in
Appendix B.
4.7 Comparison of Classification-based and
Estimation-based Upset Detection
The classification accuracies of the different classifiers were compared to the accuracy
of performing upset detection by simply thresholding a direct measurement or estimate
according to the specific upset definition. This investigation was performed to evaluate the
classification-based approach to upset detection proposed in this thesis against the more
classical estimator-based approaches to upset detection that were found in the literature.
To avoid having to physically implement all the different estimator-based approaches
found in literature, the abstraction was used that the estimated anemometric variable
provided by an unbiased state estimator could be modelled by adding zero mean Gaussian
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white noise, with a variance equal to the estimate covariance of the estimator, to the true
anemometric variable. The upset detection accuracies of the classification-based approach
and the estimation-based approach were therefore compared as a function of the amount of
noise added to the measurements/estimates of the anemometric variables. The objective
was to determine at what level of measurement/estimation noise does the classification-
based approach provide better accuracy than the estimator-based approach.
4.8 Evaluating Locations of False Alarms
The practical performance of the different classifiers as upset detection functions were
evaluated. The anemometric measurements at which the false alarms and the missed
detections occurred were compared to the classification boundary and also to the statis-
tical distribution of the anemometric measurements that is expected to be encountered
in normal flight with moderate turbulence. This was done to verify that the false alarms
and missed detections only occur close to the classification boundary and that there are
neither missed detections that are deep into the upset domain, nor false alarms that are
well within the domain of normal flight. The locations of the false alarms generated by the
upset detection system is an important metric to ensure a reliable system. The anemo-
metric measurements at which false alarms occur should be located near the classification
boundary to ensure sufficient separation between the false alarms and the anemometric
measurements encountered in normal flight domain.
4.9 Validation Manoeuvres
Simulations were then performed with the Airbus A330 model to validate the performance
of the upset detection function with simulated upset manoeuvres.
Validation manoeuvres are typically used to validate guidance and control law systems
that are in the development stage. The aim is usually to check the compliance of the de-
veloped systems with the set of requirements. The set of manoeuvres used to evaluate
longitudinal controllers was modified to make the aircraft enter the upset domain. Ma-
noeuvres resulting in upset or recovering from upset were used to determine whether the
classifiers were trained on representative data, as well as to verify the classifiers’ accuracies
in simulated flight.
Three types of validation manoeuvre were performed: within normal flight envelope,
exiting normal flight envelope into the upset domain, and re-entering the normal flight
envelope when recovering from the upset domain. The validation manoeuvres were per-
formed at a range of flight points. These flight points were distributed as a grid at fixed
intervals over the aircraft’s airspeed and altitude range.
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Chapter 5
High Angle of Attack Upset
Detection
This chapter presents the definition of high angle of attack and the evaluation of an angle
of attack upset detection system for commercial passenger airliners that uses classification
algorithms operating on a combination of anemometric and inertial sensor measurements.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, a definition of high angle of attack upset
is formulated to serve as the basis for the upset detection. Next, the training and testing
data for the classifiers is described. A number of different classifiers are then trained
on the data set to detect the angle of attack upset. The different classifiers are tested
on the testing data set and their performances as classifiers are evaluated. As part of
the evaluation, an investigation is performed to explore the sensitivity of the classifier
accuracy results to the training parameters that were used. The classification accuracy
of the classification-based approach is also compared to the accuracy of estimation-based
approaches. Next, the locations of the false alarms and missed detections relative to the
classification boundary are evaluated and compared to the angle of attack distribution
encountered in normal flight. Finally, the angle upset detection system is validated with
simulated upset manoeuvres using a representative flight dynamics model for a commercial
passenger aircraft.
5.1 Definition of High Angle of Attack Upset
Before angle of attack upset detection can be performed, we must first define precisely
what is considered to be a ”high angle of attack upset” so that different aircraft states (and
their associated sensor measurements) can be labelled as either ”non-upset” or ”upset”.
The upset detection classifiers will be trained on the labelled data, which means that
the final upset detection will be performed based on the upset detection that was used to
label the data. In this study a high angle of attack upset was considered as an angle of
attack exceeding the critical angle of attack. The critical angle of attack is the angle of
attack at which the lift coefficient, as a function of angle of attack, reaches a maximum, as
shown in Figure 5.1. The critical angle of attack was calculated as a function of altitude
and airspeed. It was found that the altitude and airspeed were the predominant influence
on the critical angle of attack, and were therefore used. This resulted in a surface that was
a function of altitude and airspeed and that separates the upset and non-upset classes,
as shown in Figure 5.2. The critical angle of attack surface for the Airbus A330 aircraft
is shown in Figure 5.3. It can be seen that the critical angle of attack has a strong
60
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dependence on the dynamic pressure (the combination of airspeed and altitude). The
true angle of attack of the simulated aircraft relative this surface is used to label given
data points.
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Figure 5.3: The critical angle of attack surface for the Airbus A330 aircraft.
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Figure 5.4: Random samples generated for the high angle of attack classifier training,
with the critical angle of attack boundary also shown.
5.2 Training Data
Figure 5.4 shows the samples distributed about the high angle of attack upset boundary.
The tight normal distribution of samples was chosen to have a standard deviation of 0.5◦.
A detailed description of the ranges and statistical distributions of all state variables,
input variables, and disturbance variables used to generate random data points for the
training data is given in Appendix A.
5.3 Classifier Results
This section gives the results of the tests conducted on the different classifiers as discussed
in Chapter 4. The comprehensive set results for all the classifiers investigated can be seen
in Appendix C.
5.3.1 Classifier Accuracy
Figure 5.5 shows the classifier accuracies of the different classifiers investigated, for both
of the sensor cases. The 95% confidence intervals for the accuracies shown were within a
0.1% interval.
When using both anemometric sensors and inertial sensors, most of the classifiers pro-
vided classification accuracies greater than 96%, with AdaBoost providing the best accu-
racy of 99.23%, and Nearest Neighbour and Naive Bayes providing the worst accuracies
of 84.6% and 89.24% respectively. Decision Trees were the top performing non-ensemble
classifier with an accuracy of 98.28%.
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Figure 5.5: The percentage of correct detections for the different classifiers, for both
sensor cases.
When using only inertial sensors, the classification accuracies of the classifiers dropped
by about 10.8% on average, with the Support Vector Machine providing the best accuracy
of 92.93% and the Naive Bayes providing the worst accuracy of 73.02%.
The AdaBoost and random forest classifier trained with only inertial sensor data
were the only classifier with overlapping accuracy intervals. McNemar’s test showed that
the accuracies produced by the AdaBoost and random forest classifiers were statistically
significant.
The majority of the classifiers had an accuracy higher than 96% for anemometric and
inertial sensors available, with the na¨ıve Bayes and nearest neighbour classifiers having
accuracies below 96%. The high accuracies were expected due to the fact that all the
information that describes the upset boundary was given to the classifiers. A model or
approximation of the upset boundary was constructed in the training process.
Removing the anemometric sensor data resulted in a reduction of information supplied
to the classifiers and caused a significant drop in classifier accuracy. An accuracy drop
was expected as the classifiers needed to infer angle of attack information from the inertial
sensors. The classifiers had no explicit information about the aerodynamics of the aircraft.
The support vector machine and the multi-classifier system were able to classify high angle
of attack upset with only inertial information with accuracies above 92%. This implies
that it is possible to detect high angle of attack upsets without anemometric data, and
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Figure 5.6: The default classifier configuration accuracies with the median, minimum
and maximum accuracies achieved in the random search of the training parameters, for
anemometric and inertial sensors available.
using only inertial data, with sufficient accuracy.
5.3.2 Sensitivity of Classifier Accuracy to Training Parameters
The default accuracy for the classifiers trained with anemometric and inertial sensors are
shown in Figure 5.6, with the blue bars. The median, minimum and maximum accuracies
of the random searches are shown with the black error lines. It was found that the
support vector machine and the decision tree’s searched parameter space produced a large
accuracy interval. This shows that a small change in the classifier’s training parameter
might result in a large accuracy change, and therefore requires a great amount of human
input to optimise. The nearest neighbour classifier was the only classifier where the default
classifier training configuration produced the lowest accuracy. This shows that the nearest
neighbour might greatly benefit from some training parameter optimisation. The rest of
the classifiers’ default accuracies were greater than the medians of the accuracies achieved
with the parameter search. This shows that the default configurations were reasonable
choices on which to evaluate the accuracies of the different classifiers for high angle of
attack upset detection. The logistic regression classifier showed little change in accuracy
with different training parameters.
The default accuracies and the accuracies obtained from the training parameter search
for only the inertial sensors available are shown in Figure 5.7. The variation in the classifier
accuracies achieved by the random training parameter search increased drastically with
the exclusion of the anemometric data in the training data set, with the exceptions of the
nearest neighbour and logistic regression classifiers. The classifiers’ accuracies produced
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Figure 5.7: The default classifier configuration accuracies with the median, minimum
and maximum accuracies achieved with the random search of the training parameters, for
only inertial sensors available.
by the default configuration were in many cases the maximum accuracy found by the
random search. The default configurations were therefore viable options for classifier
evaluation with high angle of attack upset using only inertial sensors in mind.
The random search conducted showed that the default classifier configurations were
reasonable choices on which to evaluate the accuracies of the different classifiers for high
angle of attack upset detection. The default classifier configurations were therefore used
throughout the tests conducted on the classifiers.
5.3.3 Classification vs. Estimation-based Upset Detection with
Noisy Anemometric Sensors
Figure 5.8 shows the classification accuracy of the multi-classifier system (MCS) com-
pared to the accuracy of simply thresholding a noisy angle of attack against the critical
angle of attack. The classification accuracy of the MCS is shown for both sensor cases.
The accuracy when using both anemometric sensors and inertial sensors decreased as the
noise increased, and flattened out at 91%. The accuracy when using only inertial sensors
remained constant at 92%. It was found that the classification-based approach outper-
formed the estimator-based approach when the standard deviation of the angle of attack
measurement/estimation noise exceeded 0.55 degrees.
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Figure 5.8: The MCS’s accuracy at different angle of attack sensor noise levels for both
sensor cases, compared with the threshold method.
5.3.4 Locations of False Alarms
Figure 5.9 shows the angle of attack distribution of the accumulated false alarms (shown
in red) and the angle of attack distribution for an A330 in normal flight (shown in green).
The angle of attack distributions shown were around the flight point of 240kn and 17500ft.
It was found that the angle of attack separation between the two distributions for the
sensor case with the anemometric and inertial sensors available was 5.5◦.
The angle of attach separation between the two distributions decreased to 4.5◦ with
the exclusion of the anemometric sensor data, as shown in Figure 5.10. This exclusion
resulted in a notable increase of false alarms situated around the flight point of 240kn
and 17500ft, from 0.65% to 10.19%.
The angle attack distribution of the false alarms was sufficiently removed from the
angle of attack distribution of an A330 in normal flight to ensure a reliable upset detection
system.
5.4 Simulation of Validation Manoeuvre
The elevator was oscillated between the minimum and maximum allowable deflections in
order to generate the manoeuvre shown in Figures 5.11 and 5.12.
Figure 5.11 shows the false alarms and missed detections generated by the high angle
of attack upset detection system with the anemometric and inertial sensors available.
The angle of attack trajectory is shown in blue, showing that a combination of all three
manoeuvres was evaluated within this trajectory. It is clear that all the false alarms
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Figure 5.9: Angle of attack distribution for the false alarms generated by the MCS
and the angle of attack distribution during cruise flight under moderate turbulence for
anemometric and INS sensors available.
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Figure 5.10: Angle of attack distribution for the false alarms generated by the MCS
and the angle of attack distribution during cruise flight under moderate turbulence for
only the INS sensors available.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK UPSET DETECTION 68
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
5
10
15
20
Time
A
n
gl
e
of
A
tt
ac
k
25
False Alarm
Missed Detection
Upset Boundary
Flight Trajectory
Figure 5.11: High angle of attack upset manoeuvre. The three types of manoeuvres
are shown. The false alarms and missed detections by the classifier trained on the anemo-
metric and inertial data are shown.
and missed detections generated by this system occur in close proximity to the upset
boundary.
Figure 5.12 shows the false alarms and missed detections for the same flight trajectory
but with upset detection performed using only inertial sensors. The number of false
alarms generated by the MCS increased from 0.78% to 4.39% for the manoeuvre shown.
The false alarm distance from the upset boundary increased, but remained within 3◦ from
the upset boundary. The aircraft’s trim angle of attack for this specific flight point was
≈ 4.5◦, the false alarms were still sufficiently removed from the typical angle of attack
expected during normal flight. Missed detections were not produced for either of the two
sensor cases.
The high angle of attack upset detection system was validated with flight manoeuvres
using a representative simulation of a commercial passenger airliner. The results showed
that the false alarms and missed detections lie in vicinity of the upset boundary as found
for the random samples in the previous section. This shows that the proposed random
training data generation method is an effective way to train classifiers for high angle of
attack upset detection.
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Figure 5.12: High angle of attack upset manoeuvre. The three types of manoeuvres
are shown. The false alarms and missed detections by the classifier trained on only the
inertial data are shown.
5.5 Conclusions
The majority of the classifiers had an accuracy greater than 96% when the anemometric
and inertial sensors were used, with the false alarms in close proximity to the high angle of
attack upset boundary. When using only the inertial sensors, the multi-classifier system
had the best performance with an accuracy of 92.5% and the false alarms in close proximity
to the high angle of attack upset boundary. The random search of the classifier training
parameters showed that the default classifier configurations were a good basis for classifier
comparison, as the default configuration produced an accuracy close to the maximum
accuracy achieved by the random search. The classification-based approach for high angle
of attack upset detection outperformed the estimator-based approach when the standard
deviation of the angle of attack measurement/estimation noise exceeded 0.55 degrees.
Classification algorithms proved to be a viable option for high angle of attack upset
detection. The multi-classifier system consisting of a support vector machine, bagging
classifier and a logistic regression classifier had the best overall performance for high angle
of attack upset detection, with the false alarms in close vicinity of the upset boundary
and achieving reliable upset detection during the validation manoeuvres.
It was also found that high angle of attack upset can be detected without anemometric
data, and using only inertial data, with sufficient accuracy.
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Chapter 6
Underspeed Upset Detection
This chapter presents definition of underspeed and the evaluation of an underspeed upset
detection function for commercial passenger airliners that uses classification algorithms
operating on a combination of anemometric and inertial sensor measurements.
The chapter starts with a definition of underspeed upset, and a description of the
classifier training data. Next, the total classifier accuracies and sensitivity to train-
ing parameters are shown. A comparison between the classification-based approach and
estimation-based approach of upset detection is presented. Following this, the locations
of the false alarms and missed detections from the upset boundary are evaluated. Finally,
the underspeed detection system is validated with simulated upset manoeuvres using a
representative flight dynamics model for a commercial passenger aircraft.
6.1 Definition of Underspeed Upset
Underspeed is defined as an airspeed that produces insufficient lift to support the aircraft’s
weight. The airspeed and the angle of attack of the aircraft are closely coupled. A reduc-
tion in airspeed results in an increase of angle of attack in order to produce sufficient lift.
The underspeed boundary was calculated as the intersection between the trim (steady
state) angle of attack and the critical angle of attack at different altitudes. Figure 6.1
shows the underspeed boundary used by the underspeed detection system. Samples with
airspeeds lower than the underspeed airspeeds shown in Figure 6.1 were labelled as un-
derspeed upset. It can be seen from Figure 6.1 that underspeed airspeed is proportional
to altitude. This is caused by the higher airspeed required to maintain the same dynamic
pressure due to the drop in air density at higher altitudes.
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Figure 6.1: The underspeed boundary for an Airbus A330 aircraft
6.2 Training Data
The data set that was used for the classifier training and testing was generated from the
Airbus A330 simulation model.
The tight normal distribution around the underspeed boundary had a standard devi-
ation of 3.5kn, as shown in Figure 6.2. The uniformly distributed samples were generated
within the aircraft state and input ranges. The underspeed detection classifiers were
trained on a data set containing 18000 equally divided samples.
6.3 Classifier Results
This section gives the results of the tests conducted on the different classifiers as discussed
in Chapter 4. The comprehensive set results for all the classifiers investigated can be seen
in Appendix D.
6.3.1 Classifier Accuracy
Figure 6.3 shows the classifier accuracies of the different classifiers investigated, for the
three sensor cases. The 95% confidence intervals for the accuracies shown were within a
0.2% interval.
When using both anemometric sensors and inertial sensors, most of the classifiers
provided classification accuracies greater than 97%, with the bagging classifier providing
the best accuracy of 99.45%, and Nearest Neighbour providing the worst accuracy of
74.74%. Decision Trees were the top performing non-ensemble classifier with an accuracy
of 99.25%.
The AdaBoost, decision tree, bagging and multi-classifier system trained on anemo-
metric and inertial sensor data had overlapping accuracy intervals. McNemar’s test
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Figure 6.2: Underspeed training data sample distribution
showed that the accuracies produced by these classifiers were statistically significant,
with p-values less than 0.05.
When using inertial sensors only, the classification accuracies of the classifiers dropped
by about 15.5% on average. When using inertial sensors only, the bagging classifier
provided the best accuracy of 89.64% and the Nearest Neighbour provided the worst
accuracy of 65.27%.
The AdaBoost, support vector machine and bagging classifier trained on only inertial
sensor data had overlapping accuracy intervals, the accuracies produced by these classifiers
were statistically significant, as given by a McNemar test.
It is clear that the accuracies of the classifiers were significantly poorer when only
inertial sensors were used to detect underspeed. A third classifier was therefore added that
detects underspeed using sensor measurements from the inertial sensors supplemented
with estimates of the ground speed and horizontal wind speed that are available from the
on-board inertial navigation system. The ground speed (Vsol) is the speed of the aircraft
in the inertial axis-system, the horizontal wind speed (Wind) is supplied in the form of a
wind magnitude and a wind head. This is used to calculate the wind components in the
North and East direction. The addition of the ground speed and wind speed estimates
resulted in a significant improvement in the classifier accuracy compared to when only
the inertial sensors were used. The multi-classifier system provided the best accuracy of
96.1% and the Nearest Neighbour provided the worst accuracy of 75.67%
The exclusion of the anemometric sensors resulted in a major reduction of classifier
accuracy. This is due to the fact that the direct airspeed measurement is not given to the
classifiers, and this loss of information resulted in poor classifier accuracy. This shows
that the underspeed upset does not manifest as clearly in the inertial sensor measurements
as the high angle of attack upset does. It was therefore decided to include estimates
of the ground speed and the horizontal wind velocity to the data that is used for the
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Figure 6.3: The accuracies achieved by the classifiers tested for all three sensor cases
classification. The addition of some airflow information resulted in a large improvement
in accuracy. A concern with the addition of these estimates is that the accuracies of the
classifiers rely strongly on the accuracy of these estimates. The assumption was made
that the estimates have unbiased errors, and were thus modelled by adding zero mean
Gaussian noise to the ideal ground and wind speed variables. This might be an optimistic
assumption and the classifier accuracies might not be as high as shown. It does show
however, that the accuracy of the classifier can be drastically improved with the addition
of some airflow information.
6.3.2 Classifier’s Sensitivity to Training Configuration
Parameters
The default accuracy for the classifiers trained with anemometric and inertial sensors are
shown in Figure 6.4, with the blue bars. The median, minimum and maximum accuracies
of the random searches are shown with the black error lines. It was found that the
accuracy intervals for the support vector machine and the decision tree were larger than
20% and 30% respectively, showing that these non-ensemble classifiers were sensitive to
training parameter changes when applied to the problem of underspeed detection. The
logistic regression had the smallest accuracy change with an interval of 0.04%, making
it extremely insensitive to the training parameters. All the classifiers except the nearest
neighbour classifier had an accuracy of the default configuration that was higher than the
median.
The default accuracies and the accuracies obtained from the training parameter search
when using only the inertial sensors are shown in Figure 6.5. The accuracy intervals
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Figure 6.4: Accuracies achieved by a random classifier training parameter search for
classifiers trained on anemometric and inertial data.
widened with the exclusion of the anemometric data. The default classifier performances
were greater than the median for the majority of the classifiers, with the nearest neighbour
and AdaBoost classifiers having a default accuracy smaller than the median. A training
configuration parameter change might result in a large improvement for the AdaBoost
classifier. The classifiers’ accuracies produced by the default configuration were in many
cases the best accuracy found by the random search. The default configurations were
therefore viable options for classifier evaluation with underspeed upset when using only
inertial sensors.
The default classifier accuracies and the minimum, maximum and median accuracies
of a random search of classifier training parameters for the classifiers trained on inertial
data and estimates of ground and wind speeds, can be seen in Figure 6.6. The majority
of the default accuracies were near the maximum accuracy achieved by the search. The
nearest neighbour had a default configuration accuracy that was lower than the median.
The support vector machine, decision tree and AdaBoost classifiers had accuracy intervals
greater than 15%, which shows that these classifiers are sensitive to training parameter
changes.
The random search conducted showed that the default classifier configurations were
reasonable choices on which to evaluate the accuracies of the different classifiers for under-
speed upset detection. The default classifier configurations were therefore used throughout
the tests conducted on the classifiers.
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Figure 6.5: Accuracies achieved by a random classifier training parameter search for
classifiers trained on only inertial data.
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Figure 6.6: Accuracies achieved by a random classifier training parameter search for
classifiers trained on inertial data and estimates of ground and wind speeds.
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Figure 6.7: Classifier accuracy at different angle of attack sensor noise levels for the
MCS
6.3.3 Classification vs. Estimation-based Upset Detection with
Noisy Anemometric Sensors
Figure 6.7 shows the classification accuracy of the multi-classifier system for the three
sensor cases, compared to the accuracy of simply thresholding a noisy airspeed sensor
against the underspeed airspeed. The accuracy when using both anemometric and inertial
sensors decreased as the noise increased, and flattened out at 89.5%. The accuracy for
sensor cases that excluded the anemometric sensors remained at a constant accuracy.
It was found that the classification-based approach outperformed the estimator-based
approach when the standard deviation of the airspeed measurement/estimation noise
exceeded 3kns, as shown in Figure 6.7.
6.3.4 Locations of False Alarms
Figure 6.8 shows the airspeed distribution of the accumulated false alarms (shown in
red) and the airspeed distribution for an A330 in normal flight (shown in green). The
underspeed distributions shown were around an altitude of 17500ft. It was found that
airspeed separation between the two distribution for the sensor case with the anemometric
and inertial sensors available was ≈ 70kn.
The airspeed separation between the two distributions decreased to ≈ 27kn with the
exclusion of the anemometric sensor data, as shown in Figure 6.9. This exclusion resulted
in a notable increase of false alarms situated around an altitude of 17500ft, from 3.1% to
14.01%.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. UNDERSPEED UPSET DETECTION 77
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
20
40
60
80
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
100
200
300
N
or
m
al
F
li
gh
t
S
am
p
le
s
400
Figure 6.8: The location of the false alarm generated by the MCS trained on anemo-
metric and inertial sensor data.
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Figure 6.9: The location of the false alarm generated by the MCS trained on only the
inertial sensor data.
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Figure 6.10: The location of the false alarm generated by the MCS trained on inertial
sensor data and estimates of the ground and wind speeds.
It was found that airspeed separation between the two distribution for the sensor case
with inertial sensors and estimates of ground speed and wind speed was ≈ 65kn, as shown
in Figure 6.10. The underspeed distributions shown were around an altitude of 17500ft.
The percentage of false alarms was 4.07% for the flight point shown.
The airspeed distribution of the false alarms and the airspeed distribution of an A330
in normal flight were sufficiently removed from one another to ensure a reliable upset
detection system, for the two sensor case where the anemometric sensors or estimates of
the ground speed and wind speed were available. This ensures a reliable upset detection
system. When only the inertial sensors were available—without any estimates of ground
and wind speed—the false alarms produced by the classifiers were situated near the normal
flight domain, this renders it unreliable at low airspeeds within the normal flight domain.
6.4 Simulation of Validation Manoeuvre
Simulations were then performed with the Airbus A330 model to validate the performance
of the underspeed upset detection with simulated upset manoeuvres.
The manoeuvres performed to validate the underspeed detection system were chosen
so that the aircraft experienced a gradual reduction in airspeed. The rate of airspeed
deceleration varied as part of the validation manoeuvre set.
Figure 6.11 shows the false alarms and missed detections generated by the underspeed
upset detection system when using both anemometric and inertial sensor data for the given
manoeuvre. The false alarms and missed detections generated were in close proximity to
the upset boundary, ensuring a reliable underspeed detection system.
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Figure 6.11: False alarms and missed detections generated by the MCS trained on
anemometric and inertial data given an underspeed manoeuvre. The speed trajectory is
shown in blue
Figure 6.12 shows the false alarms and missed detections for the same flight trajectory
but with the underspeed upset detection system using only the inertial sensor data. The
number of false alarms and missed detections and the distance from the upset boundary
increased significantly. The false alarms that were the furthest away from the upset
boundary were at an airspeed of ≈ 195kn which is well within the normal flight envelope
of the aircraft, and the majority of the underspeed samples were misidentified. This shows
that reliable underspeed upset detection with this system is not possible.
Figure 6.13 shows the false alarms and missed detections generated by the under-
speed upset detection system when using inertial data supplemented with estimates of
the ground and wind speeds obtained from the on-board inertial navigation system. The
false alarms and missed detections were low and in close proximity to the underspeed
boundary, ensuring a reliable underspeed detection system.
The underspeed upset detection system was validated with flight manoeuvres using
a representative simulation of a commercial passenger airliner. The results showed that
the false alarms and missed detections lie in vicinity of the upset boundary as found
for the random samples in the previous section. This shows that the proposed random
training data generation method is an effective way to train classifiers for underspeed
upset detection.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. UNDERSPEED UPSET DETECTION 80
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Time (s)
C
al
ib
ra
te
d
A
ir
sp
ee
d
(k
n
)
250
False Alarm
Missed Detection
Upset Boundary
Flight Trajectory
Figure 6.12: False alarms and missed detections generated by the MCS trained on only
inertial data given an underspeed manoeuvre. The speed trajectory is shown in blue
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Figure 6.13: False alarms and missed detections generated by the MCS trained on iner-
tial data and estimates of the ground and wind speeds, given an underspeed manoeuvre.
The speed trajectory is shown in blue
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6.5 Conclusions
The classification-based underspeed upset detection when anemometric and inertial sen-
sors were available, had an exceptionally high accuracy of 99.45% for the bagging clas-
sifier, with the false alarms and missed detection in close proximity to the underspeed
boundary. This provided a reliable means of underspeed detection using classification
techniques. A random search of the classifier training parameters showed that the de-
fault classifier configurations were a good basis for classifier evaluation, as the accuracies
achieved by the default classifier configuration were among the best accuracies achieved
by the random classifier parameter search. The classification-based underspeed detection
was compared with the estimation-based approach for underspeed detection, it was found
that the classification-based approach outperformed the estimation approach when the
standard deviation of the airspeed measurement/estimation noise exceeded 3kns. It was
found that it was not possible to detect underspeed reliably using classifiers trained only
on inertial data, as the false alarms generated were within the normal flight domain. The
addition of estimates of ground speed and wind speed supplied sufficient information to
accurate and reliably detect underspeed upset. With the multi-classifier system providing
an accuracy of 96.1% and with the false alarms and missed detections in close proxim-
ity to the underspeed boundary. The multi-classifier system consisted of the three top
performing classifiers which were, a support vector machine, bagging classifier and an
AdaBoost classifier.
The system was validated with flight manoeuvres using a representative simulation of
a commercial passenger airliner.
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Chapter 7
Dynamic Pitch Upset Detection
This chapter presents the definition of dynamic pitch and the evaluation of a dynamic
pitch upset detection function for commercial passenger airliners that uses classification
algorithms operating on a combination of anemometric and inertial sensor measurements.
The chapter starts with the definition of dynamic pitch upset and a description of the
classifier training data. The total classifier accuracies and sensitivity to training config-
uration parameters are shown. A comparison between the classification-based approach
and estimation-based approach of upset detection is presented. Next, the locations of the
false alarms and missed detections relative to the classification boundary are evaluated
and compared to the expected angle of attack and pitch rates encountered in normal flight.
Finally, the dynamic pitch detection system is validated with simulated upset manoeuvres
using a representative flight dynamics model for a commercial passenger aircraft.
7.1 Dynamic Pitch Upset Definition
Dynamic pitch upset is a predictive form of high angle of attack upset. We define a
dynamic pitch upset as a condition where the predicted angle of attack given the current
angle of attack and pitch rate will exceed the critical angle of attack even if maximum
elevator deflection is immediately applied to oppose the pitch rate. The maximum angle of
attack that would be reached if full opposing elevator is applied from a given initial angle
of attack and pitch rate is determined via forward simulation. This maximum angle of
attack reached is compared to the critical angle of attack used in the high angle of attack
upset detection function. The aircraft is considered to be in a dynamic pitch upset if
the maximum angle of attack reached exceeds the critical angle of attack. The maximum
angle of attack is calculated at different altitudes and airspeeds (flight points). Due to the
time scale separation between the flight path angle and the pitch angle, the flight path
angle is assumed to remain constant during the manoeuvre. The rate of change of the
angle of attack is therefore assumed to be equal to the pitch rate during the manoeuvre.
Figure 7.1 shows the dynamic pitch upset boundary at a specific flight point (alti-
tude and airspeed). It was defined that the minimum angle of attack, at negative pitch
rates, may not exceed an angle of attack less than zero, as shown in the blue line in
Figure 7.1. The boundary was calculated at different altitudes and airspeeds to form a
four-dimensional boundary over pitch rate (Q), angle of attack, altitude and airspeed.
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Figure 7.1: The dynamic pitch upset boundary for an Airbus A330 aircraft. The upper
angle of attack limit is shown in red and the lower angle of attack limit is shown in blue.
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Figure 7.2: The training data set’s sample distribution for dynamic pitch upset.
7.2 Training Data
The data set that was used for the classifier training and testing was generated from the
Airbus A330 simulation model.
Figure 7.2 shows the pitch rate and angle of attack sample distribution of the training
data set. The tight normal distributed samples around the dynamic pitch upset boundary
had an angle of attack standard deviation of 0.5◦ and a pitch rate standard deviation of
1◦. A description of the distributions and their associated ranges used to generate the
training data are shown in Appendix A.
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7.3 Classifier Results
A number of different classifiers were trained on the data set to detect dynamic pitch
upset.The training procedure as discussed in Chapter 4, was followed.
This section gives the results of the tests conducted on the different classifiers, as
discussed in Chapter 4. The comprehensive set results for all the classifiers investigated
can be seen in Appendix E.
7.3.1 Classifier Accuracy
The different classifiers were then tested on the testing data set and their performances
as classifiers were evaluated, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Figure 7.3 shows the classifier accuracies of the different classifiers investigated, for
both of the sensor cases. The 95% confidence intervals for the accuracies shown were
within a 0.15% interval.
When using both anemometric sensors and inertial sensors the bagging classifier pro-
vided the best accuracy of 93.9%, and logistic regression classifier provided the worst
accuracies of 68.3%. Decision Trees were the top performing non-ensemble classifier with
an accuracy of 91.7%.
The Na¨ıve Bayes and nearest neighbour classifier trained on anemometric and inertial
sensor data were the only classifier with overlapping accuracy intervals. McNemar’s test
showed that the accuracies produced by the Na¨ıve Bayes and nearest neighbour classifiers
were statistically significant with p-values less that 0.05.
When using inertial sensors only, the classification accuracies of the classifiers dropped
by about 4.05% on average. When using inertial sensors only, the multi-classifier system
containing a support vector machine, bagging classifier and an AdaBoost classifier, pro-
vided the best accuracy of 91.4% and the logistic regression classifier provided the worst
accuracy of 66.13%.
The accuracies were considerably lower than the classifier accuracies for the high
angle of attack and underspeed upset detection systems. This can be attributed to the
complexity of the four dimensional dynamic pitch upset boundary.
7.3.2 Classifier’s Sensitivity to Training Configuration
Parameters
An investigation was performed to explore the sensitivity of the classifier accuracies to
the training parameters that were used, as discussed in Chapter 4.
The default accuracy for the classifiers trained with anemometric and inertial sensors
are shown in Figure 7.4, with the blue bars. The median, minimum and maximum
accuracies of the random searches are shown with the black error lines.
It was found that the classifiers’ searched parameter space produced a large accuracy
interval. This shows that a small change in the classifier’s training parameter might re-
sult in a large accuracy change, and therefore requires a great amount of human input
to optimise.The nearest neighbour classifier was the only classifier where the default clas-
sifier training configuration produced the lowest accuracy. This shows that the nearest
neighbour might greatly benefit from some training parameter optimisation. The rest of
the classifiers’ default accuracies were greater than the medians of the accuracies achieved
with the parameter search. This shows that the default configurations were reasonable
choices on which to evaluate the accuracies of the different classifiers for high angle of
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Figure 7.3: The percentage of correct detections made by the different classifiers for
the dynamic pitch upset class.
attack upset detection. The logistic regression classifier showed little change in accuracy
with different training parameters.
The default accuracies and the accuracies obtained from the training parameter search
for only the inertial sensors available are shown in Figure 5.7. The variation in the classifier
accuracies achieved by the random training parameter search showed little change with
the exclusion of the anemometric data. The classifiers’ accuracies produced by the default
configuration were in many cases the maximum accuracy found by the random search.
The default configurations were therefore viable options for classifier evaluation with high
angle of attack upset using only inertial sensors in mind.
The random search conducted showed that the default classifier configurations were
reasonable choices on which to evaluate the accuracies of the different classifiers for dy-
namic pitch upset detection. The default classifier configurations were therefore used
throughout the tests conducted on the classifiers.
7.4 Classification vs. Estimation-based Upset
Detection with Noisy Anemometric Sensors
The classification accuracies of the different classifiers were compared to the accuracy of
performing upset detection by simply thresholding direct measurements or estimates of
the angle of attack and pitch rate against the angle of attack and pitch rate boundary of
the dynamic pitch upset definition, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Figure7.6 shows the classification accuracy of the multi-classifier system compared to
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Figure 7.4: Accuracies achieved by a random search for the training parameters of the
classifiers trained on anemometric and inertial sensor data.
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Figure 7.5: Accuracies achieved by a random search for the training parameters of the
classifiers trained on only inertial sensor data.
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Figure 7.6: The multi-classifier system’s accuracy at different angle of attack sensor
noise intensities for both sensor cases. The percentage of correct detections made by the
threshold method is shown in black.
the accuracy of simply thresholding a noisy angle of attack against the angle of attack of
the dynamic pitch upset boundary. The classification accuracy when using both anemo-
metric and inertial sensors flattened out at 89%, as the angle of attach noise increased.
The accuracy when only using inertial sensors remained constant at 91%. It was found
that the classification-based approach outperformed the estimator-based approach when
the standard deviation of the angle of attack measurement/estimation noise exceeded 1.2
degrees, as shown in Figure 7.6.
7.4.1 Locations of False Alarms
The practical performance of the different classifiers as dynamic pitch upset detection
functions were evaluated, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Figure 7.7 shows the false alarms generated by the multi-classifier system in the Q−α
plane. The normal flight sample under moderate turbulence is shown in green, with the
upset boundaries shown in black. The normal flight samples were generated at a flight
point of 17500ft and 240kn. All the upset boundaries within the flight point interval
are shown as black lines in the figure. The false alarms generated by the multi-classifier
system trained on anemometric and inertial sensor data and the false alarms generated
by the dynamic pitch upset detection system trained on only the inertial data are shown
in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 respectively. The dynamic pitch upset detection system trained
on anemometric and inertial sensor data generated false alarms in close proximity to the
dynamic pitch upset boundary, with no false alarms in the normal flight domain, with
the majority of the false alarms at low pitch rates and high angle of attack values. The
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Figure 7.7: The positions of the false alarms generated by the MCS trained on anemo-
metric and inertial sensor data. The sample distribution of straight and level flight in
moderate turbulence is shown in green.
number of false alarms generated by the dynamic pitch upset detection system trained on
only the inertial data increased. The distance of the samples from the upset boundary
increased with the exclusion of the anemometric sensors. However, some false alarms did
occur within the normal flight domain.
The false alarms and normal flight samples of an A330 in normal flight were suffi-
ciently removed from one another to ensure a reliable upset detection system, for the case
where both the anemometric and inertial sensors were available. The exclusion of the
anemometric sensors resulted in the occasional false alarm within the normal flight do-
main. These false alarms can easily be removed with a low pass filter. Since the sporadic
nature of the false alarms, it will be a single sample within a time sequence that can easily
removed with filtering.
7.5 Simulation of Validation Manoeuvre Results
Simulations were then performed with the Airbus A330 model to validate the performance
of the dynamic pitch upset detection with simulated upset manoeuvres.
The elevator was oscillated between the minimum and maximum allowable deflections
in order to generate the manoeuvre shown in Figures 7.9 and 7.10. The manoeuvre shown
was completed at a flight point of 17500ft and 240kn.
Figure 7.9 shows the flight trajectory of a manoeuvre performed; the arrows indicate
the direction of the flight trajectory. The false alarms and missed detections generated
by the dynamic pitch upset detection system trained on anemometric and inertial sensor
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. DYNAMIC PITCH UPSET DETECTION 89
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Angle of Attack (deg)
P
it
ch
R
at
e
(d
eg
/s
)
Cruise Samples
False Alarms
Upset Boundary
Figure 7.8: The positions of the false alarms generated by the MCS trained on only
inertial sensor data. The sample distribution of straight and level flight in moderate
turbulence is shown in green.
data are shown. The false alarms and missed detections were in close proximity to the
upset boundary, ensuring reliable dynamic pitch upset detection.
The false alarms and missed detections generated by the dynamic pitch upset detection
system trained on only inertial sensor data can be seen in Figure 7.10. This sensor case
generated considerably more false alarms than the case where both the anemometric and
inertial sensor data were available. False alarms stretched deep within the normal flight
domain, which is cause for concern. The missed detections remained in close proximity
to the upset boundary and did not increase considerably.
The validation manoeuvres provided valuable information about shortcomings in the
classifier training data, that were corrected in the results shown. The dynamic pitch
upset detection system was validated using flight manoeuvres representative of a real-
world scenario. The results showed that the false alarms and missed detections lie in
vicinity of the upset boundary as found for the random samples in the previous section.
This shows that the proposed random training data generation method is an effective way
to train classifiers for dynamic pitch upset detection, for the case where the anemometric
and inertial sensors available. The upset detection system trained on only inertial sensors
produced false alarms within the normal flight domain. A study should be conducted to
determine whether these false alarms can be mitigated.
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Figure 7.9: False alarms and missed detections generated by the multi-classifier system
trained on anemometric and inertial sensor data during an upset manoeuvre.
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Figure 7.10: False alarms and missed detections generated by the multi-classifier system
trained on only inertial sensor data during an upset manoeuvre.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. DYNAMIC PITCH UPSET DETECTION 91
7.5.1 Conclusions
The bagging classifier using both anemometric and inertial sensor data were the top per-
forming classifier with an accuracy 93.9$ with the false alarms and missed detections
in close proximity ot the upset boundary, allowing reliable dynamic pitch upset detec-
tion. The classification-based approach for dynamic pitch outperformed the estimation
approach for estimation errors on the angle of attack greater than 1.2 degrees. The exclu-
sion of the anemometric sensor data resulted in a 2% drop in classifier accuracy with the
multi-classifier system providing the best accuracy of 91.4%. The dynamic pitch upset
detection system generated sporadic false alarms in the normal flight domain.
The system was validated with flight manoeuvres using a representative simulation
of a commercial passenger airliner. When using anemometric and inertial sensor data,
the system performed as expected with the false alarms in close proximity to the upset
boundary. When using only the inertial sensor data, the dynamic pitch upset detection
system generated false alarms within the normal flight domain. This may be a result of
the upset boundary being to complex for the classifiers to train on, and requires further
investigation.
Classification algorithms proved to be a viable option for dynamic pitch upset detec-
tion. The multi-classifier system consisting of a support vector machine, bagging classifier
and an AdaBoost classifier had the best overall performance for dynamic pitch upset de-
tection, with the false alarms in close vicinity of the upset boundary and achieving reliable
upset detection during the validation manoeuvres. The upset detection system when us-
ing only inertial sensors produced sporadic false alarms within the normal flight domain.
A study should be conducted to determine whether these false alarms can be mitigated,
with the use of a simplified upset boundary or with filtering.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter consists of a summary of the work done in this study, concluding remarks on
passenger aircraft upset detection using classification techniques, and recommendations
for future work on upset detection.
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
In this study, three aerodynamic upset detection function using classification algorithms
were developed and tested on an Airbus A330 model. The upset detection systems made
use of anemometric and inertial sensor data in typical conditions. A secondary system was
developed that only uses data outputs from the inertial navigation unit to detect upset
in case of the loss of any or all of the anemometric sensors. It was assumed that a fault
detection and isolation system would be in place which could detect a faulty sensor; this
would be used to switch between the two upset detection systems. The system developed
in this study will enable pilots of commercial passenger aircraft to detect and recognise
upset events in order for the correct recovery actions to be taken.
The three upsets investigated were high angle of attack upset, underspeed upset, and
a predictive form of high angle of attack upset named dynamic pitch upset. An aircraft
is considered to be in a high angle of attack upset when the aircraft’s angle of attack
exceeds the angle of attack at which the maximum lift is produced (the critical angle of
attack). Underspeed was defined as the airspeed that results in a trim angle of attack that
is higher than the critical angle of attack, resulting in the inability to fly at that airspeed
without stalling. Dynamic pitch predicts high angle of attack upset given a pitch rate
and angle of attack, when a maximum elevator deflection is applied to counter the pitch
rate. The maximum angle of attack that would be reached was determined with a forward
simulation and compared with the critical angle of attack.
A wide variety of classifiers were investigated in order to determine the feasibility
of classification for upset detection. The classification algorithms investigated can be
divided into two categories: non-ensemble and ensemble. The non-ensemble classification
algorithms investigated for upset detection were support vector machine, decision tree,
na¨ıve Bayes, nearest neighbour and logistic regression. These classifiers all make use of
different assumptions when classifying a sample. The ensemble classifiers investigated
were AdaBoost classifier, random forest, bagging and a multi-classifier system.
Training the classifiers on simulated upsets was not feasible due to the small number
of upset samples generated compared to the non-upset samples, and for optimal classifier
training, equal numbers of upset and non-upset samples are required. It was also not
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practical to recreate all possible upset events. A novel sampling strategy was therefore
devised to train the classifiers. The training data set comprised of the union between
two separately generated data sets. The first data set was widespread, sampled over the
entire aircraft state space. This was to ensure that the classifiers were able to classify
any possible aircraft state combination, even if it was not normally reachable using flight
control inputs. The second data set consisted of a tight normal distribution around the
upset boundaries. This was to add resolution around the upset boundaries so that the
classifiers could accurately classify samples that were near the upset boundaries.
The samples generated from the sensor measurements were labelled using the upset
definitions as described, and then used to train the classifiers. Learning curves were used
to ensure that all the classifiers were sufficiently trained, making for an even comparison
between the classifiers. The classifiers were set up to perform at or near an equal error
rate using ROC curves. Tenfold Monte Carlo cross-validation was used to reduce any
training data bias, and training of all the non-deterministic classifiers was repeated ten
times to reduce training bias. These repetitions were used to calculate a 95% confidence
interval on all the results.
The support vector machine and logistic regression were the most accurate of the non-
ensemble classifiers, and the na¨ıve Bayes and nearest neighbour classifiers were the least
accurate. The ensemble classifiers that had the highest accuracies were the multi-classifier
system and the bagging classifier, and the random forest was the least accurate. The multi-
classifier system generalised the best, with little over-fitting. The classifier trained on data
from the inertial navigation system proved to be robust to anemometric sensor noise,
adding redundancy to the anemometric sensors. The missed detections and false alarms
generated by the multi-classifier system only occurred close to the classification boundaries
and there were neither missed detections that were deep into the upset domain, nor false
alarms that were well within the domain of normal flight. Manoeuvres that entered
and exited the upset domain were used to test the developed upset detection systems
with a real-world scenario. A random search within the classifier training parameters
space showed that the default classifier configurations produced relatively high accuracies,
making it a viable basis of classifier comparison. The search also showed the sensitivity of
the different classifiers to their training configurations, with the support vector machine
and the decision tree being the most sensitive and the logistic regression classifier the
least sensitive.
The high angle of attack upset detection system was able to detect the upset with
98.8% accuracy, when anemometric sensors were available. The false alarms were in close
proximity of the upset boundary. When only inertial sensors were used, the detection ac-
curacy of the system was reduced to 92.2%, with all the false alarms and missed detections
still in the vicinity of the upset boundary. The validation manoeuvres corroborated the
results shown, proving that the sample-based approach for the training of the classifiers
was valid.
The underspeed upset detection using both anemometric and inertial sensor measure-
ments was able to detect the underspeed with 99.3% accuracy when anemometric sensors
were available, with the false alarms within 5 knots of the underspeed boundary. When
only inertial sensors were used, the underspeed detection accuracy reduced by 10% to an
accuracy of 89.4%. The false alarms occurred further away from the underspeed bound-
ary resulting in false alarms within the normal flight domain. The underspeed detection
function using only inertial sensor data was then augmented by adding estimates of the
ground speed and wind speed (which are also available from the inertial navigation system
on typical passenger aircraft) to the sensor data used to perform the underspeed classi-
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fication. The addition of these estimates resulted in a significant accuracy improvement
to 96.1%, with the false alarms returning to the vicinity of the underspeed boundary.
The complexity of the dynamic pitch upset boundary resulted in false alarms being
not as close to the dynamic pitch boundary as desired. The upset detection system had
an accuracy of 93.6% when both anemometric and inertial sensor data was available, with
the false alarms in close vicinity of the upset boundary. When only inertial sensors were
used, the detection accuracy was reduced by 2.2% to 91.4%. The false alarms remained
in close proximity to the upset boundary. However, some false alarms did occur in the
normal flight domain.
The classification-based upset detection system developed provided a reliable method
for detecting high angle of attack, underspeed and dynamic pitch upsets, provided that
both the anemometric and inertial sensors are available. The false alarms and missed de-
tections generated by the system were in close proximity of the upset boundaries, resulting
in an exceptionally low probability of false alarms being generated during normal flight,
contributing to the reliability of the system. The high angle of attack upset detection
system was the only upset detection function that maintained reliable upset detection,
when only the inertial sensors are available. The false alarms and missed detections were
in close proximity of the high angle of attack boundary resulting in an accurate and re-
liable system. Estimates of wind and ground speed were added to the underspeed upset
detection system functioning on only the inertial data, to preserve reliable underspeed
upset detection. The dynamic pitch upset detection system operating with only inertial
sensors, produced false alarms within the normal flight domain. This may cause pilot
distrust, rendering the dynamic pitch upset detection system unreliable. The dynamic
pitch system is a predictive form of high angle of attack upset detection. The loss of
anemometric sensors therefore only inhibits the ability to predict high angle of attack
upset, and not the ability to detect high angle of attack upset. It is proposed to split the
dynamic pitch upset boundary into two domains, namely pitch rates grater than zero and
pitch rates less than zero. The classifiers trained on this simplified version of the upset
boundary may provide a reliable method for dynamic pitch upset detection.
The validation manoeuvres initially provided valuable information regarding short-
comings in the classifier training data. It was found that the accuracy of the classifiers
are greatly effected by the training data, and that special care should be given to the fea-
tures ranges used to train the classifier. The validation manoeuvres showed inadequate
feature ranges that were corrected. The validation manoeuvres lastly showed that the
false alarms and missed detections are in close proximity of the upset boundary, thus
validation the system.
The multi-classifier system provided the most accurate and reliable form of upset de-
tection for the three upset classes, this is due to the generality added by using multiple
classifiers. Combining the three classifiers does not add any significant complexity to the
classification process. The multi-classifier system typically consisted of a support vector
machine, an ensemble of decision trees (bagging or AdaBoost) and/or a logistic regres-
sion classifier. The given classification problem of upset detection has a maximum of 14
features that the classifiers are trained on, this is a relative small number of features.
The support vector machine and logistic regression classifier therefore required little com-
putational resources in classifying new observations. By limiting the maximum depth
and number of the decision trees in the ensemble resulted in an ensemble classifier that
required little computational resources. It is therefore viable to detect upset conditions
with classification techniques on a flight computer within the timing requirements.
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8.2 Recommendations for Future Work
This study was an investigation into the use of classification algorithms as an option for
upset detection, as well as into the possibility of using inertial sensor data to add redun-
dancy to anemometric sensor data. Estimation of anemometric data from inertial data is
an alternative which can be used to add redundancy to the anemometric data. Suggested
recommendations for future work is to do a quantitative comparison between classifier-
based upset detection and to use estimated anemometric data within conventional upset
detection systems.
Classifier performance on an on-board flight computer should also be investigated
to ensure that the chosen classification algorithms are able to run within the timing
requirements of the overall system. The ability of the classifier-based upset detection
system to run within the timing requirements of an aircraft is an important aspect in
ensuring reliable upset detection.
Multiple assumptions were made about the noise added to the sensor measurement
used for classifier training and testing. A comprehensive study on sensor noise modelling
should be conducted in order to improve the representativeness of the results obtained in
this study.
It would also be useful to identify the top-performing classifier according to the spec-
ifications set, and to do a comprehensive classifier optimisation with the training config-
uration and training data used here.
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Appendix A
Input and Output Specifications
This appendix presents the sensors used for upset detection with the range and noise
associated with each sensor. The range of the sensor measurements were taken from the
ranges within the simulation model supplied by Airbus, this do not represent the absolute
maximum and minimum measurements the sensor can measure, but rather the boundaries
of the simulation model. The sensor noise were postulated form the sampling resolution
and sampling frequency of the sensors.
A.1 Simulation Inputs and Initialisations
A.1.1 State Initialisation
The states initialised of the simulation model were the speed vector, angular rates and
the aircraft attitude. The initial Euler attitude was converted to the quaternion attitude
for use within the simulation. Tables A.1 and A.2 show the distributions of the initial
states used to generate the random samples for the high angle of attack upset.
Table A.1: The Aircraft state initialisation for the widely distributed samples.
Name Wide Sample Dis-
tribution’s Range
Calibrated Airspeed (Vcas) U(180, 340) kn
Angle of Attack (α) U(0, 20)◦
Side-Slip (β) N (µ = 0, σ2 = 25)◦
Roll Angle (φ) U(−20, 20)◦
Pitch Angle (θ) N (µ = α, σ2 = 100)◦
Yaw Angle (ψ) 0◦
Roll Rate (P) U(−5, 5)◦/s
Pitch Rate (Q) U(−25, 25)◦/s
Yaw Rate (R) U(−5, 5)◦/s
Table A.1 shows the wide sample distributions for the initial states and Table A.2
shows the tight normal sample distributions about the upset boundaries. The tight sample
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distribution for the high angle of attack upset class had normal distribution with a variance
of 0.25◦ around the critical angle of attack surface (αCrit(Alt, Vcas)). The tightly normal
distributed samples around the underspeed boundary (Underspeed(Alt)) had a variance
of 12.25 kn. The samples distributed around the dynamic pitch upset boundary were a two
dimensional Gaussian distribution with a variance of 0.25◦ for the angle of attack and 1◦/s
for the pitch rate. The dynamic pitch boundary was determined as were the critical angle
of attack and the turning angle of attack are equal, αCrit(Alt, Vcas) = αturn(Alt, Vcas, α,Q).
The turning angle of attack is the maximum angle of attack reached given a pitch rate
and an angle of attack and maximum opposing elevator applied.
Table A.2: The Aircraft state initialisation of the tight normal distributed samples.
State Name Tight Sample Distribution about Upset Boundary
Range
High Angle of Attack Upset
Angle of Attack (α) N (µ = αCrit(Alt, Vcas) , σ
2 = 0.25)◦
Underspeed Upset
Calibrated Air-
speed (Vcas)
N (µ = Underspeed(Alt), σ2 = 12.25)kn
Dynamic Pitch Upset Upset
Angle of Attack (α) N (µ = f(α) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k(αcrit(i, j)− αturn(i, j, α, k) = 0),
σ2 = 0.25)◦
Pitch Rate (Q) N (µ = g(Q) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
l(αcrit(i, j)− αturn(i, j, l, Q) = 0),
σ2 = 1)◦/s
A.1.2 Simulation Inputs
The simulation inputs are shown in Table A.3, these inputs were kept the same for all the
samples generated. The wind disturbance were taken as a uniform distribution between
the 10th and 90th percentile of the global wind taken for 2015. The aerodynamic model
does not take thrust as an input, the thrust were therefore taken as a constant value of
1.2◦.
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Table A.3: List of simulation inputs distribution specifications.
Name Wide Sample Dis-
tribution’s Range
Altitude (Alt) U(0, 40 000)ft
Aileron Deflection (δail) U(−16, 16)
◦
Elevator Deflection (δelv) U(−16, 16)
◦
Rudder Deflection (δrud) U(−5, 5)
◦
Thrust 1.2◦
Airbrakes Disengaged
Longitudinal Wind (Uwind) U(10%, 90%)
Lateral Wind (Vwind) U(10%, 90%)
Normal Wind (Wwind) U(10%, 90%)
A.2 Output Sensor Description
This section gives a description of the sensor measurements used in the upset detections
system. The sensor resolution and sample rate are given with the variance of the assumed
noise added to the calculated sensor measurements.
A.2.1 Anemometric Sensors
The three anemometric sensors used for upset detection were Calibrated Airspeed (Vcas),
Angle of Attack (α) and Side-slip Angle (β). Table A.4 shows the anemometric sensor
specifications and the variance of the noise added to the simulated sensor measurement.
This noise assumes a faultless sensor operating under normal flight conditions. A faulty
sensor might become biased and the sensor noise might increase.
Table A.4: The anemometric sensor description and specifications.
Sensor Name Analogue to
Digital LSB
Resolution
(∆)
Sampling
Frequency
(fs)
Noise
Variance
Calibrated Airspeed (Vcas) 0.0625 kn 8.15 0.0106 kn
Angle of Attack (α) 0.0439◦ 16.31 0.0105◦
Side-Slip (β) 0.0439◦ 16.31 0.0105◦
A.2.2 Inertial Sensors
The inertial sensor specifications are shown in Table A.5. The assumption was made
that the inertial sensors were not biased and that the random walk were negligibly small
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as taken from the Honeywell product brochures for the QA2000 accelerometer and the
GG1320AN Digital Laser Gyro.
Table A.5: The inertial sensor description and specifications.
Sensor Name Analogue to
Digital LSB
Resolution
(∆)
Sampling
Frequency
(fs)
Noise
Variance
Altitude (Alt) 0.125 ft 25 0.1302 ft
Roll Angle (φ) 0.005493◦ 50 0.0005◦
Pitch Angle (θ) 0.005493◦ 50 0.0005◦
Yaw Angle (ψ) 0.005493◦ 50 0.0005◦
Flight Path Angle (γ) 0.005493◦ 25 0.0003◦
Roll Rate (P) 0.003906◦/s 50 0.0003◦/s
Pitch Rate (Q) 0.003906◦/s 50 0.0003◦/s
Yaw Rate (R) 0.003906◦/s 50 0.0003◦/s
Longitudinal Total Body
Acceleration (ax)
0.000122 G 50 0.0000002 G
Lateral Total Body Acceler-
ation (ay)
0.000122 G 50 0.0000002 G
Normal Total Body Acceler-
ation (az)
0.000122 G 50 0.0000002 G
A.2.3 Ground speed and Wind
The wind speed components are calculated form a wind magnitude and heading supplied
by the INS. It is assumed that there were a small estimation error made by the INS to
supply the estimates of the wind speed. Table A.6 shows the ground speed and wind
speed noise specifications as taken for the underspeed upset detection.
Table A.6: The ground speed and wind speed estimate descriptions .
Sensor Name Analogue to
Digital LSB
Resolution
(∆)
Sampling
Frequency
(fs)
Noise
Variance
Ground Speed (Vsol) 0.125 kn 25 0.1302 kn
Longitudinal Wind Speed
(Uwindest)
0.007813 kn 12.5 0.0003 kn
Lateral Wind Speed
(Vwindest)
0.007813 kn 12.5 0.0003 kn
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Appendix B
Classifier Training Parameter Search
The classifier training configuration parameter search for each of the classifiers are de-
scribed. A random search was conducted within the classifier training parameter space
to determine the sensitivity of the different classifiers to a change in training parameters.
This is used to determine the amount of tuning necessary to achieve a high accuracy for a
given classifier. The parameter ranges and sampling strategies are given in this appendix.
The default training parameters were included within the parameter search space.
B.1 Support Vector Machine
B.1.1 Default Training Parameters
The default Scikit-Learn training parameters are shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1: SVM’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter Description Parameter Value
C Penalty Parameter 1.0
gamma Kernel Coefficient 1/features
kernel Kernel type used Radial Bases Function
tol Tolerance for stopping crite-
rion
1e-3
B.1.2 Parameter Search
Table B.2 shows the SVM’s training parameter and the parameter ranges searched.
104
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Table B.2: SVM’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
C [0.5 10.5] Uniformly sampled
gamma [0 0.5] Uniformly sampled
kernel [linear, poly, rbf, sigmoid] Randomly drawn
tol [0.0001 0.01] Uniformly sampled
B.2 Decision Tree
B.2.1 Default Training Parameters
The default Scikit-Learn training parameters for the Decision tree classifier are shown in
Table B.3.
Table B.3: DT’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter Description Parameter Value
Criterion The function to measure the
quality of a split
gini
Max Features The maximum features to
search for a split
All the Features
Max Depth The maximum amount of
layers in the tree
No limit
Min Samples Split The minimum number of
samples required to split an
internal node
2
Min Samples Node The minimum number of
samples required to be at a
leaf node
1
B.2.2 Parameter Search
The training parameters searched are shown in Table B.4. The parameter ranges are
shown with the sampling strategy used.
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Table B.4: DT’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
Criterion [Gini,Entropy] Randomly Drawn
Max Features [1, 11] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Max Depth [3,None] Randomly Drawn
Min Samples Split [1, 11] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Min Samples Node [1, 11] Uniform integer distri-
bution
B.3 Na¨ıve Bayes
The na¨ıve bayes classifier does not have any training parameters, it assumes feature
independence and a Gaussian distribution spread of the two classes. The were therefore
no parameters searched for the na¨ıve bayes classifier.
B.4 Nearest Neighbour
B.4.1 Default Training Parameters
The default Scikit-Learn training parameters for the nearest neighbour classifier are shown
in Table B.5.
Table B.5: knn’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter Description Parameter Value
n neighbours Number of neighbours to
use
5
Leaf size Leaf size passed to Ball tree
or KD tree
30
Weights Weight function used in pre-
diction
Uniform
B.4.2 Parameter Search
The nearest neighbour parameter ranges searched are shown in Table B.6.
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Table B.6: knn’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
n neighbours [5 50] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Leaf size [20 100] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Weights [Uniform, Distance] Randomly Drawn
B.5 AdaBoost
B.5.1 Default Training Parameters
The default AdaBoost training parameters used by Scikit-Learn are shown in Table B.7.
Table B.7: AdaBoost’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter Description Parameter Value
Base Estimator The weak learner from
which the ensemble is built
Decision Tree
n Estimators The number of weak learn-
ers used
50
Learning Rate Learning rate shrinks the
contribution of each classi-
fier
1
Algorithm The boosting algorithm
used
SAMME.R
B.5.2 Parameter Search
The Scikit-Learn AdaBoost classifier’s training parameter ranges used in the random
search are shown in Table B.8.
Table B.8: AdaBoost’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
Base Estimator [Decision Tree] Randomly Drawn
n Estimators [20 200] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Learning Rate [0 1] Uniformly Sampled
Algorithm [SAMME SAMME.R] Randomly Drawn
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B.6 Random Forest
B.6.1 Default Training Parameters
The default random forest Scikit-Learn parameters are shown in Table B.9.
Table B.9: RF’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter De-
scription
Parameter Value
n Estimators The number of deci-
sion trees in ensemble
10
Criterion The splitting criterion
used
gini
Max depth The maximum depth
of the trees grown
No limit
Min Samples Split Minimum number of
samples required to
split a node
2
Min Samples Leaf Minimum number of
samples in leaf nodes
1
B.6.2 Parameter Search
The training parameters searched for the random forest classifier are shown in Table B.10.
Table B.10: RF’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
n Estimators [10 100] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Criterion [gini,entropy] Randomly Drawn
Max Depth [3 10] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Min Samples Split [1 11] Uniform integer distri-
bution
Min Samples Leaf [1 11] Uniform integer distri-
bution
B.7 Bagging Classifier
B.7.1 Default Training Parameters
The default Bagging classifier training parameters used are shown in Table B.11.
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Table B.11: Bagging’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter De-
scription
Parameter Value
Base Estimator The weak learner used
in ensemble
Decision tree
n Estimators The number of weak
learners used in en-
semble
10
Max Samples Maximum amount of
samples drawn
100% of samples
Max Features The number of fea-
tures drawn for train-
ing
100% of features
B.7.2 Parameter Search
The Bagging classifier’s training parameter searched are shown in Table B.12.
Table B.12: Bagging’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
Base Estimator [Decision Tree] Randomly Drawn
n Estimators [10 100] Uniform Integer Dis-
tribution
Max Samples [30% 70%] Uniformly distributed
Max Features [30% 70%] Uniformly distributed
B.8 Multi Classifier System
The multi classifier system is a combination of the three top performing classifiers. The
classifier fusion is taken as the majority vote of equally weighted classifiers. There is
therefore no additional training done by the multi classifier system that can be searched.
B.9 Logistic Regression Classifier
B.9.1 Default Training Parameters
Table B.9 show the default Scikit-Learn parameters used for the logistic regression clas-
sifier.
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Table B.13: LR’s default training parameter description.
Parameter Name Parameter De-
scription
Parameter Value
C Inverse of regularisa-
tion strength
1
Solver Gradient decent opti-
misation algorithm
liblinear
B.9.2 Parameter Search
The logistic regression training configuration parameters searched are shown in Table B.10
Table B.14: LR’s training parameter random search description.
Parameter Name Parameter Search
Range
Search description
C [0.5 10] Uniformly Distibution
Solver [newton-cg, lbfgs, liblinear] Randomly Drawn
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Appendix C
Additional High Angle of Attack
Upset Classification Results
C.1 Classifier Learning Curves
The learning curves show the classifier accuracy trained on an increasing number of train-
ing samples. This is used to determine that the training dataset were large enough to
ensure a sufficiently trained classifier for high angle of attack upset detection. All classi-
fiers were trained with sufficiently large datasets to ensure fully trained classifiers. This
is clear from the small confidence intervals at large datasets, and the little increase in
classifier accuracy at higher training sample numbers. Tenfold cross-validation was done
on the different sizes of training datasets. The 95% confidence intervals were calculated
from the ten fold cross validation.
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Figure C.1: The SVM’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.2: The DT’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.3: The NB’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.4: The knn’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.5: The AdaBoost’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.6: The RF’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.7: The Bagging’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.8: The MCS’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.9: The LR’s learning curve for both sensor cases.
C.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves for
Classifiers
The receiver operating characteristic curves are shown for all the classifiers trained to
detect high angle of attack upset. The ROC curves for both sensor cases are shown on
the same figure. These curves offer insight into the false alarms and missed detections
generated at different thresholds on the probability outputs of the classifiers. The classi-
fiers are required to perform at an equal error rate, the ROC curves are used to determine
the desired threshold to ensure an equal error rate. It is clear from the ROC curves shown
that the EER’s threshold was typically near a probability of 0.5. The ROC curves can be
used to bias the classifiers towards missed detections to reduce the amount of false alarms
generated.
The DT and AdaBoost classifiers are rule based classifiers that are trained to perform
at an equal error rate at a threshold of 0.5, the ROC curves are therefore not smooth for
these two classifiers.
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Figure C.10: The SVM’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.11: The DT’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.12: The NB’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.13: The knn’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.14: The AdaBoost’s ROC
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.15: The RF’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure C.16: The Bagging’s ROC curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure C.17: The MCS’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK UPSET CLASSIFICATION
RESULTS 115
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
10
0%
-
%
M
is
se
d
D
et
ec
ti
on
s
% False Alarms
Anemometric and INS
INS
Figure C.18: The LR’s ROC curve for both sensor cases.
C.3 Classifier Accuracy at Multiple Noise Levels
The classifier accuracies at different noise levels on the angle of attack sensor are shown
in Figure C.19 to C.27. The noise on the angle of attack was assumed to be a zero mean
gaussian distribution. The standard deviation of the noise were varied between 0 degrees
to 3 degrees and the percentage of correct detections were calculated.
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Figure C.19: The SVM’s accuracy at
different angle of attack sensor noise lev-
els.
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Figure C.20: The DT’s accuracy at dif-
ferent angle of attack sensor noise levels.
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Figure C.21: The NB’s accuracy at dif-
ferent angle of attack sensor noise levels.
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Figure C.22: The knn’s accuracy at dif-
ferent angle of attack sensor noise levels.
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
C
or
re
ct
D
et
ec
ti
on
s
Angle of Attack sensor noise standard deviation (deg)
Anemometric and INS
INS
Threshold
Figure C.23: The AdaBoost’s accuracy
at different angle of attack sensor noise
levels.
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Figure C.24: The RF’s accuracy at dif-
ferent angle of attack sensor noise levels.
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Figure C.25: The Bagging’s accuracy at
different angle of attack sensor noise lev-
els.
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Figure C.26: The MCS’s accuracy at
different angle of attack sensor noise lev-
els.
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Figure C.27: The LR’s accuracy at different angle of attack sensor noise levels.
C.4 False Alarm Distribution
This section shows the angle of attack distribution of the false alarms generated by clas-
sifiers as well as the angle of attack distribution of an Airbus A330 during normal flight
at 17500ft and 240kn under moderate turbulence.
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Figure C.28: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.29: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.30: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.31: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.32: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.33: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.34: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.35: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.36: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution
for the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.37: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution for
only the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.38: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.39: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.40: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.41: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.42: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.43: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure C.44: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure C.45: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
C.5 Classifier Accuracy during an Upset Manoeuvre
This section shows the false alarm and missed detections generated by the classifier dur-
ing a high angle of attack validation manoeuvre. The manoeuvre performed tested three
aspects of the classification based upset detection function. Classifiers were tested during
manoeuvres that fell within the normal flight operational envelope. The classifiers were
secondly tested om manoeuvres that resulted in the aircraft entering the upset domain.
Manoeuvres recovering from an upset event were lastly tested. The position of the false
alarms and missed detections from the upset boundary were evaluated. The manoeu-
vres were used to identify whether the sensor measurements in the training dataset were
representative of typical manoeuvres within the upset and normal cruise domains.
The blue line in the figures shows the angle of attack trajectory during the manoeuvre.
The black line show the upset boundary for the given altitude and airspeeds, a one degree
region from the upset boundary in each direction are indicated with the two red lines.
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It is preferable if the false alarms and missed detections fall within this region. The
false alarms are indicated with red dots and the missed detections are indicated with
green dots. The AdaBoost and LR classifiers were the only classifiers that produced false
alarms and missed detections that fell within the ±1◦ region for both sensor cases. The
majority of the classifiers’ false alarms and missed detections when the anemometric and
INS sensors were within the ±1◦ region from the upset boundary.
The majority of the rule based classifiers (DT,RF,Bagging), had poor accuracy for
the case where only the INS data was available, with false alarms well within the normal
cruise domain of the aircraft.
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Figure C.46: SVM’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.47: SVM’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.48: DT’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.49: DT’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.50: NB’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
5
10
15
20
Time
A
n
gl
e
of
A
tt
ac
k
25
Figure C.51: NB’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.52: knn’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.53: knn’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.54: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.55: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and missed detections during a manoeu-
vre with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.56: RF’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.57: RF’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.58: Bagging’s false alarm
and missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.59: Bagging’s false alarm
and missed detections during a manoeu-
vre with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.60: MCS’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.61: MCS’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Figure C.62: LR’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure C.63: LR’s false alarm and
missed detections during a manoeuvre
with only the inertial sensors available
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Appendix D
Additional Underspeed Upset
Classification Results
D.1 Underspeed Upset Detection Classifier
Learning Curves
This section shows the learning curves for the classifiers used for underspeed upset detec-
tion. The classifiers were trained with datasets increasing in size, and the accuracy were
recorded. The learning curves are shown for the three sensor cases namely, anemometric
and inertial sensors available, only inertial sensors available and inertial with estimates of
the ground and wind speed available. These curves were used to ensure that the classifiers
were sufficiently trained.
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Figure D.1: The SVM’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.2: The DT’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.3: The NB’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.4: The knn’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.5: The AdaBoost’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.6: The RF’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.7: The Bagging’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.8: The MCS’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.9: The LR’s learning curve for both sensor cases.
D.2 Receiver Operator Characterisation Curves for
Classifiers
This section shows the ROC curves for the different classifiers used in underspeed up-
set detection. The ROC curves for all three sensor cases are shown in Figure D.10 to
Figure D.18. The false alarms and missed detections were determined at increasing prob-
ability thresholds in order to determine the ROC curves.
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Figure D.10: The SVM’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.11: The DT’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.12: The NB’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.13: The knn’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.14: The AdaBoost’s ROC
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.15: The RF’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.16: The Bagging’s ROC curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure D.17: The MCS’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure D.18: The LR’s ROC curve for both sensor cases.
D.3 Underspeed Upset Detections at Different
Airspeed Noise Levels
The classifier accuracies at different noise levels on the airspeed sensor are shown in
Figure D.19 to D.27. The noise on the airspeed sensor was assumed to be a zero mean
gaussian distribution. The standard deviation of the noise were varied between 0kn to
30kn and the percentage correct detections were calculated.
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Figure D.19: The SVM’s accuracy at
different noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.20: The DT’s accuracy at dif-
ferent noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.21: The NB’s accuracy at dif-
ferent noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.22: The knn’s accuracy at dif-
ferent noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.23: The AdaBoost’s accuracy
at different noise levels on the airspeed
sensor for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.24: The RF’s accuracy at dif-
ferent noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.25: The bagging’s accuracy at
different noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.26: The MCS’s accuracy at
different noise levels on the airspeed sensor
for the three sensor cases.
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Figure D.27: The LR’s accuracy at different noise levels on the airspeed sensor for the
three sensor cases.
D.4 False Alarm Distribution
This section shows the airspeed distribution of the false alarms generated by classifiers as
well as the airspeed distribution of an Airbus A330 during normal flight at 17500ft and
240kn under moderate turbulence.
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Figure D.28: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.29: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.30: SVM’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
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Figure D.31: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.32: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.33: DT’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
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Figure D.34: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.35: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.36: NB’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
500
1000
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
200
C
ru
is
e
S
am
p
le
s
400
Figure D.37: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.38: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.39: knn’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
50
100
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
200
C
ru
is
e
S
am
p
le
s
400
Figure D.40: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution
for the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure D.41: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution for
only the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.42: AdaBoost’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the
inertial sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
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Figure D.43: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.44: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.45: RF’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
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Figure D.46: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.47: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.48: Bagging’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the
inertial sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
20
40
60
80
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
100
200
300
N
or
m
al
F
li
gh
t
S
am
p
le
s
400
Figure D.49: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure D.50: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.51: MCS’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL UNDERSPEED UPSET CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 139
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
20
40
60
80
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
100
200
300
C
ru
is
e
S
am
p
le
s
400
Figure D.52: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
F
al
se
A
la
rm
S
am
p
le
s
Calibrated Airspeed (kn)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
C
ru
is
e
S
am
p
le
s
350
Figure D.53: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure D.54: LR’s false alarm and cruise angle of attack distribution for the inertial
sensors with ground speed and wind speed available.
D.5 Validation Manoeuvre
This section shows the false alarm and missed detections generated by the classifier during
an upset validation manoeuvre. The manoeuvre performed tested three aspects of the
classification based upset detection function. Classifiers were tested during manoeuvres
that fell within the normal flight operational envelope. The classifiers were secondly tested
on manoeuvres that resulted in the aircraft entering the upset domain. Manoeuvres
recovering from an upset event were also tested. The position of the false alarms and
missed detections from the upset boundary were evaluated. The manoeuvres were used
to identify whether the sensor measurements in the training dataset were representative
of typical manoeuvres within the upset and normal cruise domains.
The blue line in the figures shows the airspeed trajectory during the manoeuvre. The
black line show the upset boundary at the given altitude. False alarms are indicated
with red dots and the missed detections are shown with green dots. The majority of
the classifiers’ false alarms and missed detections when the anemometric and INS sensors
were in close vicinity of the upset boundary.
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Figure D.55: False alarms and missed
detections generated by SVM trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.56: False alarms and missed
detections generated by SVM trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Time
C
al
ib
ra
te
d
A
ir
sp
ee
d
250
Figure D.57: False alarms and missed detections generated by DT trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.58: False alarms and missed
detections generated by DT trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.59: False alarms and missed
detections generated by DT trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.60: False alarms and missed detections generated by DT trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.61: False alarms and missed
detections generated by NB trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.62: False alarms and missed
detections generated by NB trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.63: False alarms and missed detections generated by NB trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.64: False alarms and missed
detections generated by knn trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.65: False alarms and missed
detections generated by knn trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.66: False alarms and missed detections generated by knn trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.67: False alarms and missed
detections generated by AdaBoost trained
with anemometric and inertial sensor data
for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.68: False alarms and missed
detections generated by AdaBoost trained
with only inertial sensor data for an under-
speed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.69: False alarms and missed detections generated by AdaBoost trained with
inertial sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeu-
vre.
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Figure D.70: False alarms and missed
detections generated by RF trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.71: False alarms and missed
detections generated by RF trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.72: False alarms and missed detections generated by RF trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.73: False alarms and missed
detections generated by Bagging trained
with anemometric and inertial sensor data
for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.74: False alarms and missed
detections generated by Bagging trained
with only inertial sensor data for an un-
derspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.75: False alarms and missed detections generated by Bagging trained with
inertial sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeu-
vre.
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Figure D.76: False alarms and missed
detections generated by MCS trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.77: False alarms and missed
detections generated by MCS trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.78: False alarms and missed detections generated by MCS trained with iner-
tial sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.79: False alarms and missed
detections generated by LR trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Figure D.80: False alarms and missed
detections generated by LR trained with
only inertial sensor data for an underspeed
manoeuvre.
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Figure D.81: False alarms and missed detections generated by LR trained with inertial
sensor data and estimates of ground and wind speeds for an underspeed manoeuvre.
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Appendix E
Additional Dynamic Pitch Upset
Classification Results
E.1 Dynamic Pitch Upset Detection Classifier
Learning Curve
Learning curves show the classifier accuracy with increasing number of training samples.
This was used to ensure that the training dataset was large enough for the classifiers to
train properly for dynamic pith upset.
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Figure E.1: The SVM’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
C
or
re
ct
D
et
ec
ti
on
s
Number of Training Samples
Anemometric and INS
INS
Figure E.2: The DT’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.3: The NB’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.4: The knn’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.5: The AdaBoost’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure E.6: The RF’s learning curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.7: The Bagging’s learning
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure E.8: The MCS’s learning curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure E.9: The LR’s learning curve for both sensor cases.
E.2 Receiver Operator Characterisation Curves for
Classifiers
The receiver operating characteristic curves are shown for all the classifiers trained to
detect dynamic pitch upset. The ROC curves for both sensor cases are shown on the same
figure. These curves offer insight into the false alarms and missed detections generated
at different thresholds on the probability outputs of the classifiers. The classifiers are
required to perform at an equal error rate, the ROC curves are used to determine the
desired threshold to ensure an equal error rate. It is clear from the ROC curves shown
that the thresholds were typically near a probability of 0.5. The ROC curves can be
used to bias the classifiers towards missed detections to reduce the amount of false alarms
generated.
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Figure E.10: The SVM’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.11: The DT’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.12: The NB’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.13: The knn’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.14: The AdaBoost’s ROC
curve for both sensor cases.
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Figure E.15: The RF’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.16: The Bagging’s ROC curve
for both sensor cases.
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Figure E.17: The MCS’s ROC curve for
both sensor cases.
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Figure E.18: The LR’s ROC curve for both sensor cases.
E.3 Classifier Noise Accuracy
The classifier accuracies at different noise levels on the angle of attack sensor are shown
in Figure E.19 to E.27. The noise on the angle of attack was assumed to be a zero mean
gaussian distribution. The standard deviation of the noise were varied between 0 degrees
to 5 degrees and the percentage correct detections were calculated.
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Figure E.19: The SVM’s accuracy at
different sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
C
or
re
ct
D
et
ec
ti
on
s
Angle of Attack sensor noise standard deviation (deg)
Anemometric and INS
INS
Threshold
Figure E.20: The DT’s accuracy at dif-
ferent sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.21: The NB’s accuracy at dif-
ferent sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.22: The knn’s accuracy at dif-
ferent sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.23: The AdaBoost’s accuracy
at different sensor noise levels for both sen-
sor cases.
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Figure E.24: The RF’s accuracy at dif-
ferent sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.25: The Bagging’s accuracy at
different sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.26: The MCS’s accuracy at
different sensor noise levels for both sensor
cases.
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Figure E.27: The LR’s accuracy at different sensor noise levels for both sensor cases.
E.4 False Alarm Position
This section shows the angle of attack and pitch rate distributions of the false alarms
generated by classifiers as well as the angle of attack and pitch rate distributions of an
Airbus A330 during normal flight at 17500ft and 240kn under moderate turbulence.
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Figure E.28: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.29: SVM’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.30: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.31: DT’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.32: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.33: NB’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.34: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.35: knn’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.36: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution
for the anemometric and inertial sensors
available.
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Figure E.37: AdaBoost’s false alarm
and cruise angle of attack distribution for
only the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.38: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.39: RF’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.40: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.41: Bagging’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.42: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.43: MCS’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
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Figure E.44: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for the
anemometric and inertial sensors avail-
able.
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Figure E.45: LR’s false alarm and
cruise angle of attack distribution for only
the inertial sensors available.
E.5 Validation Manoeuvre
This section shows the false alarm and missed detections generated by the classifier during
an upset validation manoeuvre. The manoeuvre performed tested three aspects of the
classification based upset detection function. Classifiers were tested during manoeuvres
that fell within the normal flight operational envelope. The classifiers were secondly tested
om manoeuvres that resulted in the aircraft entering the upset domain. Manoeuvres
recovering from an upset event were lastly tested. The position of the false alarms and
missed detections from the upset boundary were evaluated. The manoeuvres were used
to identify whether the sensor measurements in the training dataset were representative
of typical manoeuvres within the upset and normal cruise domains.
The blue and red line in the figures shows the angle of attack and pitch rate trajectory
during the manoeuvre. The black line show the upset boundary for the given altitude
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and airspeeds. The false alarms are indicated with red dots and the missed detections are
indicated with green dots.
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Figure E.46: False alarms and missed
detections generated by SVM trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.47: False alarms and missed
detections generated by SVM trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.48: False alarms and missed
detections generated by DT trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.49: False alarms and missed
detections generated by DT trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.50: False alarms and missed
detections generated by NB trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.51: False alarms and missed
detections generated by NB trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.52: False alarms and missed
detections generated by knn trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.53: False alarms and missed
detections generated by knn trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.54: False alarms and missed
detections generated by AdaBoost trained
with anemometric and inertial sensor data
for a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.55: False alarms and missed
detections generated by AdaBoost trained
with only inertial sensor data for a dy-
namic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.56: False alarms and missed
detections generated by RF trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.57: False alarms and missed
detections generated by RF trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.58: False alarms and missed
detections generated by Bagging trained
with anemometric and inertial sensor data
for a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.59: False alarms and missed
detections generated by Bagging trained
with only inertial sensor data for a dy-
namic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.60: False alarms and missed
detections generated by MCS trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.61: False alarms and missed
detections generated by MCS trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL DYNAMIC PITCH UPSET CLASSIFICATION RESULTS162
0 5 10 15 20 25
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Angle of Attack
P
it
ch
R
at
e
25
Figure E.62: False alarms and missed
detections generated by LR trained with
anemometric and inertial sensor data for
a dynamic pitch manoeuvre.
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Figure E.63: False alarms and missed
detections generated by LR trained with
only inertial sensor data for a dynamic
pitch manoeuvre.
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